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Abstract
With the growth of the global Internet, users have begun to download and run programs for
more different purposes and from more varied sources than ever before. These programs
should not be allowed to cause harm to a user's system or data, either as a result of malicious
code created by an adversary or buggy code that could cause accidentally. Users may have
different ideas of what constitutes harm than the program's authors, so they need a flexible
way to specify the capabilities and limitations of untrusted programs.
Naccio is a platform-independent architecture for defining safety policies that describe
what a program cannot do. To enforce those policies, programs are transformed to inte-
grate safety checking into their operation at run-time. This thesis presents the design of
Naccio/Win32, which applies the Naccio architecture to enforce policies on executables
running under Microsoft Windows. A prototype implementation provides a proof of con-
cept, and results presented here provide a demonstration of the effectiveness and efficiency
of Naccio/Win32's mechanisms.
Naccio/Win32 provides a greater degree of flexibility than any previous code safety
system. Safety policies can be written and enforced with no in-depth knowledge of the sys-
tem, and are specified as general constraints on program actions, rather than being targeted
reactions known attacks. New policies can easily be deployed to adapt to changing security
needs or system vulnerabilities. The enforcement of policies through transformation is
optimized to minimize the overhead introduced, so that users will not suffer a noticeable
loss of performance.
Thesis Supervisor: John Guttag
Title: Professor of Computer Science and Engineering
Co-Supervisor: David Evans
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Chapter 1
Introduction
As the usage of computers and the Internet has grown, the amount and importance of data
that users keep on their computers has increased, along with the potential risks when that
data is manipulated or transmitted by programs. At the same time, the distribution of many
and varied programs has become easier and more common. Mobile code downloaded on-
demand allows great flexibility in content and capability provided on the World Wide Web.
Viewers for new file formats allow users to extend the range of data they can utilize, and
plug-ins or applets add new functionality. Users are even beginning to purchase applications
online and download them for use.
Users often download code from sources that they do not entirely trust, and should be
able to run that code without allowing it to do damage to their system. Even code from
reliable sources often contains bugs that could cause damage, particularly if the data being
processed by that code could itself have been generated by an adversary. Users may also
have a different standard of safe behavior than that of a program's authors. For instance,
a program may be written to transmit the user's personal information via the network
for registration purposes, while the user may wish to protect his privacy. Code safety is
required to prevent malicious or buggy code from causing damage. Researchers have long
appreciated its importance [16], and as it has become easier to distribute programs through
the global network companies and individuals have become increasingly concerned about
what damage a program may cause.
Naccio is a code safety system designed to provide robust code safety while meeting
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three key goals: flexibility, usability, and efficiency. Providing code safety in today's
computing environment requires greater flexibility than modem operating systems provide.
There is a need for a code safety system that can protect system resources from malicious
or buggy code, without limiting the ability of valid code to do useful work. This requires
that different programs be run with varying levels of trust and capability. For instance, a
software installer might be limited to using certain portions of the file system and not using
the network, while a video-player applet might be allowed network access but no access
to the user's files. A primary weakness of code safety systems is that they often fail when
attacked in ways their designers did not foresee, so a good system should make it easy for
new safety mechanisms to be created and deployed to deal with new threats or security
needs. All of this requires that a code safety system be flexible, allowing a wide variety of
policies to be defined and enforced.
No code safety system can be effective if it is not used, and thus usability is an overriding
concern. It must be simple for users to protect themselves, and only require a small amount
of effort for administrators to install and configure the system and tailor it to their needs.
Code safety must be applied to any programs a user wishes to run, without placing any
unacceptable burden or trust on the author of that software to cooperate with the safety
system.
In addition, efficiency must be a major goal. Users will not use a code safety system if
it introduces unacceptable overhead in the time taken to download or run code, and system
administrators will not deploy it if it requires unacceptable set-up time, processing, or
storage requirements. The safety system must be unobtrusive, and introduce a minimum of
delays or additional demands for computing resources. It should certainly have no impact
on programs that are not being limited by a safety policy.
Naccio is a flexible platform-independent architecture for defining safety policies and
enforcing those policies on programs, designed to meet the three key goals of flexibility,
usability, and efficiency. Conceptually, Naccio takes as inputs a program and a description
of a safety policy, and produces a new program as output, as shown in Figure 1-1. That
trusted program behaves as the original program would until such time as the safety policy
is violated, at which point action is taken to respond to the violation.
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Untrusted Program 
Safety Policy
Trusted Program
Figure 1-1: Naccio conceptual functionality
Safety policies are defined in a simple, platform-independent way that allows maximal
flexibility by allowing new policies to be easily created and used on multiple platforms.
Policies are enforced by transforming programs before they are executed. The input program
can be in a fully-compiled executable format, eliminating any requirements for the use of
safe languages or specialized compilers. There is also no need for disclosure of source
code, which allows program writers to protect the intellectual property of their program
designs.
Since all safety checking is incorporated directly into the program itself, no special
support is required from the operating system or run-time environment. Also, safety
checking can be tailored to a specific application and policy, thus eliminating any overhead
associated with unnecessary safety checks. Each application can be run under a different
policy, making code safety easy to tailor to specific needs. New policies that respond to
new threats are easy to deploy by re-transforming affected applications.
This thesis describes Naccio/Win32, a system that enforces Naccio safety policies on
Windows programs. A platform for Naccio is defined by the set of system functions con-
trolled by Naccio, and by the binary format of the input program. Implementing Naccio for a
specific platform requires a back-end to perform the required transformations in a platform-
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specific way, and a platform interface that describes the functions protected. Naccio/Win32
controls Windows programs by placing constraints on their use of Win32 API system calls.
The integrity of Naccio/Win32's high-level policy transformations depends on low-level
transformations that prevent untrusted programs from bypassing safety mechanisms.
Naccio/Win32 provides a greater degree of flexibility than any previous code safety
system. The most commonly used code-safety systems are virus checkers and the Java
Virtual Machine. Most virus checkers detect known sequences of malicious code. They
are effective at detecting known viruses in programs, but cannot adapt quickly to new
threats, and offer no protection from programs that may cause damage for reasons other
than being infected. Java provides a virtual machine to run programs in an environment
where they are isolated from system resources. While this is often effective at controlling
programs, it relies on run-time interpretation or compilation of bytecodes, resulting in
extreme performance penalties when compared to native executables. Java's security model
also places severe restrictions on the types of actions that can be controlled. Verification
of programs can be used to show that they satisfy required properties, as is performed by
the Java bytecode verifier [40]. Proof Carrying Code [21] and cryptographic signatures
provide alternate verification techniques. Unfortunately, the limitations of automatic proof-
generation techniques, and the need for trusted compilers respectively limits their usefulness.
Operating system centered approaches can be effective, but system-level safety checks often
have a performance penalty on trusted programs as well as untrusted ones. Perhaps the
most effective such approach is Generic Software Wrappers [9], which applies checking
to API functions as Naccio does but uses a kernel extension rather than transformation to
apply the checks. Other transformation-based systems such as SFI [37] [29], Ariel [23],
and SASI [36] provide greater degrees of flexibility with less performance overhead than a
virtual machine, but do so in platform-specific ways. None of these solutions (analyzed in
more detail in Chapter 8) provides the level of flexibility, usability, and efficiency provided
by Naccio/Win32.
The rest of this thesis describes the Naccio/Win32 design and presents a prototype
implementation that provides a proof of concept. Chapter 2 gives a more detailed overview
of the Naccio architecture. Chapter 3 discusses issues that arise in applying Naccio to
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the Win32 platform specifically, and introduces the design of Naccio/Win32. Details of
that design are presented in two parts: Chapter 4 describes the policy transformations
used to enforce policies by controlling system calls and Chapter 5 describes lower-level
protective transformations used to ensure that safety checking cannot be bypassed by
untrusted programs. Chapter 6 describes a prototype implementation of Naccio/Win32,
and Chapter 7 describes results obtained using that prototype to enforce policies on sample
applications. Chapter 8 describes previous work in code safety and program transformation
as it relates to Naccio. Finally, Chapter 9 concludes and presents ideas for future work.
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Chapter 2
Nacciol
2.1 Naccio Architecture Overview
Naccio 2 is a platform-independent architecture for code safety. It allows safety policies
to be defined in a platform-independent way and enforces those policies on programs by
transforming code.
Naccio transforms programs to produce a trusted program guaranteed to satisfy the
specified safety policy. The trusted program is generated by controlling the program's use
of system calls. A safety policy is expressed in terms of a platform-independent set of
resources. The transformation occurs in two stages, as shown in Figure 2-1. The first stage
is performed once for each safety policy, independent of any individual application. The
policy compiler takes the following inputs:
Safety Policy: A description of the constraints to be placed on the program. Safety
policies are expressed in terms of abstract resources, and are platform-independent.
For example, a safety policy could specify a limitation on the number of bytes that
an application may write to files.
'Much of the platform-independent architecture of Naccio has been developed separately by David Evans
and the author, and is described in [7].2The name Naccio is extracted from catenaccio, a soccer tactic where a team defends aggressively near
the midfield. Like catenaccio, Naccio seeks to protect a system by disarming potential attackers before they
are allowed to run rampant on the wrong side of a protection boundary. Naccio is also an acronym for "Never
Again Could Code Inflict Outrage" and "No Acronym Can Create Instant Ovations".
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Resource Descriptions
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Platform Librar~y:
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Per-Policy Calls( Policy Description FilePer-Program
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Figure 2-1: Naccio components and operation
" Resource Descriptions: Abstract operational descriptions of system resources.
These are platform-independent, allowing program behavior to be specified and con-
strained without relying on platform-specific notions. For example, an abstract file
system resource would include descriptions of all operations that can be performed
on a file system, including a write operation that could be constrained by the policy
mentioned above.
" Platform Interface: An operational description of a particular system platform,
such as the Win32 API, that describes the effect that each system call has on abstract
resources. For example, the platform interface might specify that a system call to
write bytes to a file corresponded to the write operation of the abstract file system,
with an argument specifying the number of bytes written.
" Platform Library: An implementation of the platform library itself. This is the
unaltered binary code provided by the platform, such as the Win32 API DLLs or Java
API classes.
The job of the policy compiler is to create a policy-specific version of the platform library
that performs all safety checking necessary to enforce the policy. Wrapper functions in the
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policy-enforcing library perform the necessary safety checks, in addition to performing the
work of the original system functions (typically by calling the original functions themselves).
The other product of the policy compiler is a policy description file. This file describes
the transformations required to enforce the specified safety policy. Usually this information
takes the form of a pointer to the policy-enforcing version of the system library, as well as
a description of which system calls must be redirected. The application transformer uses
this information to transform applications and enforce the policy.
If the trusted program is to be guaranteed to satisfy the specified safety policy it must
be unable to affect protected system resources without using the policy-enforcing version
of the system library. This requires some lower-level transformations, to ensure that the
program cannot bypass the policy-enforcing library. It may also be necessary to reject
some classes of programs altogether, either because they can be shown at transform time
to violate the safety policy, or because they cannot be transformed safely. For example,
self-modifying code is likely to fall in the latter category for most Naccio implementations.
While the Naccio architecture itself is platform-independent, the transformations them-
selves must be performed in a platform-specific way. The implementation of Naccio for a
particular platform includes creating the platform interface, as well as a policy compiler and
application transformer specific to a particular platform library, operating system, processor
architecture, and executable format. This thesis describes that process for the Microsoft
Windows platform, presenting the design and a prototype implementation of Naccio/Win32.
2.2 Expressing Safety Policies
The application transformer produces an alternate version of an application that behaves
in the same way as the original application, except that it is guaranteed not to violate the
selected safety policy. As well as taking different action in the case of a violation, the
transformed application must perform the extra bookkeeping required to implement the
checks that detect these violations, and thus the behavior of the trusted program may differ
from that of the untrusted program in areas such as running time or memory usage. The
behavior constrained by Naccio is defined in terms of a set of abstract resources, which
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are platform-independent notions of platform-dependent system resources. The way in
which these are defined is described in Section 2.2.1. Examples of resources that can be
described include a file system, a network connection, an environment variable, or a thread.
Safety policies are specified as limitations on the manipulation of these resources, using the
method described in Section 2.3.
2.2.1 Describing Resources
Resource descriptions provide a way to identify resources and the ways they are manip-
ulated. They are generally platform-independent, but can be used to describe platform-
specific resources such as the Windows registry. Resources are described by listing their
operations, which identify the ways a resource can be manipulated. Resource operations
have no implementation; they are merely hooks for use in defining safety policies.
The meaning of a resource operation is indicated by its associated documentation. The
essential promise is that a transformed program will invoke the resource operation with
the correct arguments whenever the documented event occurs. It is the job of the policy
compiler and platform interface to ensure that this is the case.
Figure 2-2 shows two sample resource descriptions. The RFileSys tem resource cor-
responds to the file system. The global modifier indicates that only one RF ileSys tem
resource exists per execution. Resources declared without a global modifier are asso-
ciated with a particular run-time object. Most of the RFileSystem operations take an
RFi le parameter, a resource object that corresponds to a particular file.
Resource manipulations may be split into more than one resource operation. For
example, reading is divided into preRead and pos tRead operations. This division
allows more precise safety policies to be expressed since some information (in this case
the exact number of bytes read) may not be available until after the system call completes.
Pre-operations allow necessary safety checks to be performed before the actual action takes
place, while post-operations can be used to maintain state and perform additional checks
after the action has completed and more information is available.
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global resource RFileSystem
operations
initialize ()
"Called when execution starts."
terminate ()
"Called just before execution ends."
openRead (file: RFile)
"Called before a file is opened for reading."
openCreate (file: RFile)
"Called before a new file is created for writing."
openWrite (file: RFile)
"Called before an existing file is opened for writing."
openAppend (file: RFile)
"Called before an existing file is opened for appending."
close (file: RFile)
"Called before a file is closed."
write (file: RFile, n: int)
"Called before n bytes are written to a file."
preRead (file: RFile, n: int)
"Called before up to n bytes are read from a file."
postRead (file: RFile, n: int)
"Called after n bytes were read from a file."
delete (file: RFile)
"Called before a file is deleted."
makeDirectory (file: RFile)
"Called before creating a directory."
//... copy and rename operations elided
observeExists (file: RFile)
"Called before revealing if a file exists."
observeLastModifiedTime (file: RFile)
"Called before revealing when a file was last modified."
setLastModifiedTime (file: RFile)
"Called before setting the last modified time on a file."
//... other similar observe<X> and set<X> operations elided
resource RFile
operations
RFile ()
"Called to construct a new RFile object."
finalize ()
"Called when finished with an RFile object."
Figure 2-2: Example resource descriptions (see Appendix A for the elided details.)
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policy LimitWrite
NoOverwrite
LimitBytesWritten(1000000)
Figure 2-3: The LimitWrite Sample Policy
2.3 Describing Policies
Safety policies are defined by attaching checking code to resource operations. Code
fragments attached to these operations can perform checks of the validity of the operation,
and perform state updates, before deciding whether or not to raise a violation. The class
of safety policies that can be expressed using Naccio is thus limited only by the resource
operations defined in the abstract resources. For example, we cannot express a policy
that enforces precise constraints on CPU usage, since no resource operations (and no
platform library calls) correspond to direct computation. Further, Naccio cannot express
any liveness properties (i.e. properties that constrain what must happen at some time in
the future), though it can approximate some by modifying program behavior to perform
specified actions (such as deleting temporary files when a program terminates). Once an
execution has reached an invalid state, the typical response is to raise a violation, which
for interactive applications provides the user with a message and a choice as to whether to
terminate the program or allow it to continue in violation of the policy.
A safety policy is described by listing safety properties and their parameters. Fig-
ure 2-3 shows the LimitWrite safety policy. It instantiates two safety properties
- NoOverwrite disallows replacing or altering the contents of any existing file, and
LimitBytesWritten (1000000 ) places a million-byte limit on the amount of data
that may be written to files. Figure 2-4 shows how these properties are defined.
A safety property consists of one or more precheck clauses that identify resource
operations and provide action code for enforcing the property. For example, the precheck
clause of the NoOverwrite property identifies the two RFileSystem operations as-
sociated with opening an existing file for writing (openWrite and openAppend), the
operation associated with deleting a file (delete), and the operations associated with
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property NoOverwrite
precheck RFileSystem.openWrite (file: RFile),
RFileSystem.openAppend (file: RFile),
RFileSystem.delete (file: RFile),
RFileSystem.setLastModifiedTime (file: RFile)
//... other set<X> operations elided
violation ("Attempt to overwrite a file.);
stateblock TrackTotalBytesWritten
addstate RFileSystem.bytes-written : int = 0;
precode RFileSystem.write (file: RFile, n: int)
byteswriten += n;
property LimitBytesWritten (limit: int)
requires TrackTotalBytesWritten;
precheck RFileSystem.write (file: RFile, n: int)
if (bytes-written > limit)
violation ("Attempt to write more than " + limit + " bytes.");
Figure 2-4: Properties used by the Limi tWrite safety policy (see Appendix A for more
properties, and adjustments to include elided operations)
modifying existing files in other ways (setLastModifiedTime and similar opera-
tions). The action code simply invokes the violation command, which will produce a
dialog box that alerts the user to the safety violation and provides an option to terminate the
program.
The LimitBytesWritten property illustrates how a more complex safety prop-
erty is defined. It takes an integer limit parameter, and constrains the total number
of bytes that may be written by the application to the value of that parameter. When
LimitBytesWrit ten is instantiated in a safety policy, limit is bound to a value. To
implement the write limit, we need to keep track of how many bytes are written. This is
done by the TrackBytesWritten state block included by the requires clause. It
adds a state variable to the RFileSystem resource, and attaches a precode action to
the RFileSys tem. write operation.
The body of the precode action will be run before any checking code associated with
the resource operation. Hence, when the LimitBytesWrit ten property check action
compares the value of bytes-written to the limit, the value of bytes-written has
already been incremented before the comparison. State maintenance and property checking
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code are kept separate, since many safety properties may utilize the same state.
2.4 Usability and Efficiency
Naccio and Naccio/Win32 are designed for optimizing usability and efficiency in the most
commonly expected scenario, where end users download and run programs using a safety
system configured by more knowledgeable system administrators. To further these goals,
the system is separated into distinct parts, allowing a separation of effort both on the part
of users and administrators, and in terms of the actual computation that must be performed
to apply and enforce safety policies.
2.4.1 Usability Concerns
The componentization of the Naccio system allows users and administrators to benefit from
the system with a minimum of knowledge and training. Increased familiarity with the
Naccio system then leads to greater degrees of flexibility in the safety policies that can be
created and enforced. If a Naccio implementation were integrated into a web browser or
OS environment, most users would never be aware of its existence unless a default policy
is violated. Appropriate transformations can be applied automatically or by administrators
when programs are installed. A more flexible system front-end can allow users to choose
from several standard safety policies when running programs or downloading them over a
network. This will be sufficient in most cases if standard safety policies are sufficiently
diverse. For further flexibility, power users and system administrators can define new
policies by combining standard safety properties and setting their parameters (as described
in Section 2.3), still requiring no detailed understanding of the underlying Naccio policy
definition mechanisms.
For interested administrators, the willingness to understand the platform-independent
framework of resources and safety policies provides the ability to write specialized safety
policies tailored to a specific application or environment. Such safety policies could
perform highly specific checking not foreseen by the authors of standard safety policies,
such as guarding against accidental misuse of program arguments or adding user-specific
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policies or quotas. No administrators need delve into the platform-specific details contained
in the platform interface due to the abstraction of the resource descriptions. A single
platform interface should be sufficient for each platform. Particularly ambitious system
administrators can make relatively minor modifications to the platform interface to provide
additional flexibility, through adding support for supplemental APIs, protecting additional
system resources, or reacting to violations in ways other than simply alerting users. It is
most likely that several of these modified platform interfaces would be distributed with
Naccio in a production system.
All of the details required to take advantage of this flexibility are encapsulated in the
platform interface and resource descriptions. Thus, it is easy for some users or applications
to use functionality provided by alternate resources or platform interfaces without affecting
others. The separation also eases the deployment of new policies or patches that address
security flaws. All that is required is to replace a single file in a single component of the
system, re-compile policies, and re-transform any affected applications, rather than any
modifications to the framework and core of the Naccio system.
2.4.2 Efficiency Concerns
It is important to optimize the efficiency of common or repeated tasks, even at the cost of less
frequent tasks. Run-time performance is the most important to minimize, since application
code can be run many times, and run-time is most noticeable to the user. Transformation
time is also important, particularly if the user wishes to download a program, transform
it, and run it immediately. Naccio and Naccio/Win32 attempt perform work early, so
that it need be performed only once, and at a time that has the least impact on the user.
This is accomplished by the separation of responsibility between the policy compiler and
the application transformer. The policy compiler performs its work only once for each
policy that is to be enforced on a given platform, thus limiting the amount of time spent
on the time-consuming compilation to create native code from the high-level description
languages of policies, resources, and the platform interface. Because it is run rarely,
the policy compiler can spend significant time on optimizations to improve the run-time
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performance of safety checks. By performing an aggressive dependency analysis, the
policy compiler can eliminate safety checking, resource operations, and platform interface
wrappers not required to enforce the selected policy. It can also pass along a list of only the
minimal set of required transformations to the application transformer. As a result, system
calls that require no checking at all remain untransformed, and those requiring checking
introduce the bare minimum of run-time overhead.
The only work that must be done for each application transformed is the redirection of
system calls to the versions provided in the policy-enforcing system library, as well as the
low-level transformations required to ensure that the untrusted code does not bypass that
library. As much work is done at transform-time as possible, saving work at run-time that
could potentially be repeated.
The counterpart to this "eager" strategy (performing computation as early as possible
to avoid repeated effort) is a "lazy" strategy that delays effort until it is guaranteed to
be needed, while still not repeating any effort. Untrusted code used by an application at
run-time can be detected by standard wrappers on the system calls used to load code, and
the transformer can be automatically invoked on the code as it is loaded. This mechanism
would be ideally suited for a program that is downloaded and run only once such as a
browser-based applet, particularly if portions of its code are downloaded on-demand.
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Chapter 3
Win32 Issues
Naccio/Win32 enforces policies on fully compiled Windows executables and their asso-
ciated dynamic link libraries (DLLs). The platform library protected by Naccio is the
Win32 API, as implemented by the system DLLs included with the various Win32 op-
erating systems (such as Windows 95/98, Windows NT, Windows 2000, and Windows
CE). Policy-enforcing versions of these DLLs are generated for each safety policy, and
application executables and DLLs are transformed to use these alternate libraries.
The transformations performed by Naccio/Win32 can be divided into two categories:
policy transformations and protective transformations. The policy transformations intro-
duce wrappers for standard Win32 API calls to produce a policy-enforcing version of the
Win32 API in the form of replacements for system DLLs. Untrusted programs are then
transformed to use these DLLs instead of the standard system DLLs. The protective trans-
formations provide the low-level code safety necessary to ensure that programs cannot
circumvent the checking in the policy-enforcing library.. The mechanisms used to provide
policy transformations are given in Chapter 4, while the protective transformations are
described in Chapter 5.
Understanding the platform-specific details of Naccio/Win32 requires some knowledge
of the workings of the Windows operating system itself. The following section describes
aspects of the Windows architecture that are important to Naccio/Win32. This discussion
is primarily based on the Windows NT operating system, which is also the basis of the
upcoming Windows 2000. Most details of other Win32 operating systems (Windows 95, 98,
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and CE) are similar, and due to the standards of the Win32 API, the policy transformations
are applicable equally well to any Win32 operating system, though the small API differences
between operating systems must be reflected in the platform interface. There are differences
between operating systems (particularly in the memory model) that are relevant only to the
protective transformations. Since the current Naccio/Win32 design and implementation is
targeted at NT, those differences will not be discussed in detail here.
After this background information has been presented, Section 3.2 discusses trade-offs
in the choice of the level at which Naccio is applied to the Win32 platform. Section 3.3
then describes the high-level design of Naccio/Win32.
3.1 The Windows Architecturel
Like most modem operating systems, Windows NT has at its core an operating system
kernel that interacts with hardware, controls basic operating system functions, and provides
a basic set of system calls for use by applications. The primary distinction between kernel
and user code (which includes applications as well as many portions of the operating system)
is based on virtual memory. Every process run on a system has its own virtual address
space, giving each process its own view of memory, which is shared among the potentially
many threads of execution within the process. Kernel code has a single view of memory
that includes the memory used by all other processes, as well as memory used only by the
kernel. An application's access to memory may be limited by page-level protections, but
this is usually the case only for portions of memory shared with other applications. User
code makes system calls to the kernel by executing a "trap" instruction to invoke kernel
code on behalf of the application process.
While the system calls provided by the NT kernel provide full functionality, applications
are not intended to use them directly. Instead, applications are written to use one of the
OS environments provided by NT: Win32, Win16, OS/2, Posix, or MS-DOS. Each OS
environment is provided by a protected subsystem: a user level process that receives
'Much detail here is based on [5], [24], [25], [26], and [19], which include much more complete details
on the NT architecture and executable format.
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requests from client processes in the form of messages via the Local Procedure Call (LPC)
mechanism, an optimized method of interprocess communication. The protected subsystem
receives requests appropriate to the environment it supports, and converts them to NT kernel
calls, as well as maintaining data structures specific to the OS environment. This conversion
is indirect, as all non-Win32 subsystems actually make calls to the Win32 subsystem, which
is the only protected subsystem (in most cases) that makes direct kernel calls.
Since programming in terms of LPC messages would be tedious, Win32 programs make
use of a standard application programming interface (API) provided as a set of functions.
These are not compiled into application code, but are instead provided in a set of dynamic
link libraries (DLLs). As described in the next section, this encapsulation of API code aids
in the application of Naccio's enforcement mechanisms.
Both DLLs and executables are stored in the same Windows PE (Portable Executable)
file format. This format is used on all Win32 platforms, which makes many of the binary
editing tasks performed by Naccio portable. The PE format contains information on the
structure of the executable image after it is loaded into memory, as well as supplemental
data for use by the loader.
DLLs are not intended to be run as independent programs, but rather to be loaded by
applications that need the functions included in the DLL. These functions and their locations
within the DLL are included in the DLL's export table. When DLLs are loaded they become
available at in the application's memory space. Since much of a DLL is read-only code or
data, it can often be shared among multiple applications without the need for more physical
memory. The use of DLLs is not limited to API functions. Applications may use DLLs
to encapsulate functions, and many supplemental APIs, operating system extensions, and
other libraries are provided as DLLs.
When loading an executable image, the loader places it in memory and runs any ini-
tialization code included in the image. This provides an excellent opportunity for Naccio
to run set-up code for safety checking. The loader also determines addresses as necessary
for any external functions that have been implicitly linked. Implicit linking is one of the
two methods of utilizing DLL functions. If it uses this method, the executable includes
an import table. That table includes a list of the DLLs imported (by name), along with
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a list of the functions imported from each DLL (by name or numerical reference). Each
named DLL is automatically loaded with the original image. The loader finds the DLL by
searching a standard set of paths, including the application's directory, the Windows system
directory, and the user's path variable.
As well as simply loading the required DLLs, the loader adjusts references to them so
that their functions can be used by the application. To accomplish this all implicitly linked
DLL accesses are in the form of indirect jump instructions, which use a target address loaded
from the import address table (IAT) in the executable image. The indirect jumps for DLL
calls are often compiled directly into the code, but procedure stubs are also included. Those
stubs consist entirely of the indirect jump instruction, and allow user code to call the stub
address and reach a DLL procedure. Those stubs also provide the address that will be used
if user code ever tries to directly access or manipulate the address of an implicitly-linked
DLL procedure.
The addresses in the IAT are filled in by the loader. Alternatively, the IAT can be filled
in beforehand by the BIND utility or the BindImage API function, which assume that
the DLL loads at its preferred address. If it does, then the loader need not do the work of
determining procedure addresses at load time. If it does not, or if a different version of the
DLL (with different procedure addresses) is loaded, then the loader recalculates the IAT
addresses appropriately.
Rather than using implicit linking, an application may explicitly link DLLs, in which
case they are loaded on demand rather than simultaneously with the application executable.
To load an explicitly linked DLL, an application calls the LoadLibrary API function,
which invokes the loader to bring the DLL into the application's address space (searching
the same standard path). It stays there until the application uses FreeLibrary to unload
it. Since there is no IAT for an explicitly linked DLL, the application can call functions
in that DLL only through the GetProcAddress function, which provides a pointer to
the specified function in memory. In Naccio, wrapped versions of these API functions
transparently substitute policy-enforcing and transformed DLLs.
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3.2 Platform Choice
There are two aspects to the choice of the platform described by a platform interface.
The first the basic platform determined by the operating system and hardware. Equally
important, though, is the position within the hierarchical structure of an operating system
where Naccio's transformations are applied. The Naccio platform is defined by the set of
system calls protected and libraries trusted, as well as by the actual method of inserting
security checks. This positioning is very important for several reasons. First, all code below
the level of this platform (such as the system libraries) will be treated as trusted code, and
assumed to have the behavior specified by the platform interface. It is only the interface
to the platform library (and its behavior) that is important, so the same platform interface
can easily be used to protect different versions of the same system library. Naccio/Win32's
primary target platform is Windows NT, but the platform can be chosen so as to make the
differences between the various Win32 operating systems (NT/2000, 95/98, CE) largely
irrelevant.
There are several possible positions in the structure of Windows NT to consider for the
Naccio platform interface. The lowest level would be actual instructions and I/O routines
of a particular processor architecture. This is not a desirable solution, as enforcing policies
at such a low level would require much architecture specific code and modifications to the
NT kernel. Any kernel modification would have effects on all programs rather than being
limited to programs running with policies.
The next possible level is the NT kernel calls. This is a well-defined API, fitting the
desired model of a platform library to be protected by Naccio. Protecting the NT kernel
would also mean that the resulting Naccio transformer could be used for all of the OS
environments provided by Windows NT. Unfortunately, such an approach would require
modifications either to the kernel or to the protected subsystems. Though they run as user
code, the protected subsystems are part of the operating system and used by all programs,
so again modifications to them would affect all programs, and be specific to NT. They could
not be used on Windows 95/98, which do not include protected subsystems. The NT kernel
calls are also undocumented, and thus would be difficult to describe accurately in a platform
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interface.
The next logical possibility is at the level of Win32 API calls. Within the operating
system, the Win32 API is the highest level of interface that is standardized, well-defined,
documented [19], and used by a majority of applications. Higher level interfaces (such as
the MFC classes or COM objects) could be chosen, but since they are implemented using
the Win32 API, there is no compelling reason to locate the platform interface at such a
high level and eliminate support for many applications. Choosing the Win32 API limits the
Naccio/Win32 transformer to Win32 programs, allowing no support for Win16, MS-DOS,
Posix, etc. Since Win32 is the dominant platform for programs running under Windows
NT, this limitation seems acceptable.
The Win32 API has the advantage of being entirely encapsulated in DLLs. With the
platform interface placed at the level of the Win32 API, system DLLs can be considered
trusted code, with wrappers being applied to their entry points by simple modifications to
import tables. An additional security benefit of the Win32 API is that most critical system
data is stored in the protected subsystems, and is thus inaccessible to untrusted code. Some
data is stored locally, and may (for certain uses and policies) need to be protected as part of
the protective transformations described in Chapter 5.
Perhaps the primary advantage, though, of identifying the Win32 API as the Naccio
platform library is that the wrappers and transformation rules that make up the transformer
can be made to be independent of a specific hardware architecture or operating system. As
long as the transformation rules apply only to Win32 API calls, then they can be applied
to any platform on which the Win32 API is supported. Since Windows NT runs on a
number of different processor architectures, this is a significant advantage. Support for
other Win32 operating systems such as Windows 95/98 and Windows CE is also possible,
though some modifications to the platform interface are necessary due to small differences
in API behavior. Executables produced by any compiler can also be supported, since the
same interface requirements that allow all code to inter-operate with the Win32 DLLs allow
it to be transformed by Naccio.
Only the policy transformations can make full use of this processor and operating system
independence. At least some of the protective transformations must be performed at the
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lowest possible level to keep untrusted code from bypassing security mechanisms. These
transformations can, however, be clearly separated from the actual API wrappers. The
wrapper-based policy transformations can be developed and tested independently, and re-
used on many different physical architectures. The lower-level protective transformations
can then be inserted as a module as appropriate.
3.3 Naccio/Win32 Design Overview
Naccio/Win32 separates the policy compiler and application transformer, as prescribed in
the Naccio architecture. As shown in Figure 3-1, the policy compiler itself is divided fur-
ther into platform-independent and platform-specific portions. The platform-independent
portion of the system is shared with Naccio systems on other platforms [7] (and written
in Java to allow operation on multiple platforms). It consists of the parsers and analyzers
for the platform-independent languages for describing program behavior and constraints on
that behavior introduced in Section 2.2. The same parsing, analysis, and optimization of
safety checking is performed for all Naccio platforms.
In Naccio/Win32 these platform-independent tasks are encapsulated in the resource
compiler, which reads and analyzes policy and resource descriptions and produces imple-
mentations of the described safety checking. The only platform-specific component of the
resource compiler is the generation of the code to implement the fully optimized resource
operations. This code will be combined with platform interface code and compiled to
produce native code that performs the specified safety checks. This is accomplished by
a simple translation of the platform-independent language of checking code into C code
that can be easily compiled into Windows DLLs. It is the responsibility of the platform
interface to ensure that each time an untrusted program performs an operation that could
affect resources, the policy-enforcing library makes a call to an appropriate function in
these DLLs. The translation of code and construction of these DLLs is described in more
detail in Section 4.1.
The resource compiler also produces a description of the results of its analysis of the
safety policy. These results are used by the platform compiler to determine which wrappers
28
Policy Compiler
Safety Poi
Resource Implementat ons
Resource
Anlsis Resul s Operation
Calls
Policy-Enforcing Platform Libra y
Win32
API
Per-Policy Calls(Policy Description File1Per-Program
Untrusted Program Trusted Program
Figure 3-1: Naccio/Win32 components and operation
are necessary. Basing its work on the platform interface, the platform compiler produces
wrappers: replacement versions of Win32 API functions that perform safety checking by
calling resource operations before or after calling actual API functions.
Wrappers are encapsulated into DLLs with appropriate export tables that allow them to
replace the Win32 system DLLs. If these replacement DLLs are located on the standard
loading path, the application transformer need only change the DLL names in the import
tables of application executables and DLLs in order to replace API functions with wrap-
pers. Since the DLL import/export interface is standardized on all Win32 platforms, this
transformation can be performed without any regard to the underlying operating system or
processor architecture.
Unfortunately, re-direction of calls is not sufficient to ensure that the policy enforced
by the modified system DLLs cannot be violated. Naccio/Win32 must also ensure that a
program cannot bypass or tamper with the safety checking mechanisms by violating the
abstraction of the DLL interface. This is done by the protective transformations described
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in Chapter 5. These include transformations to prevent the program from making direct
calls to the original system DLLs and from loading or construction of arbitrary pieces of
untransformed code. Additionally, the protective transformations must provide protection
against direct modification of data used by safety policy code, or by the API functions.
They must also prevent uncontrollable program behavior, such as self-modifying code or
direct calls to the kernel. Some protective transformations can be implemented through
the use of the wrappers. For instance, memory protection can be enforced by controlling
access to Win32 memory protection routines. Some protective transformations, however,
must be implemented at the very lowest level - raw machine code - to prevent malicious
attackers from exploiting low-level tricks to avoid safety checks. As a result, the design and
implementation of the protective transformations is specific to a single processor architecture
(e.g. x86 or Alpha).
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Chapter 4
Policy Transformations
The policy transformations insert wrappers in place of system calls, so that safety checks
will be performed as the modified application runs. That task is divided between the
three major system components. The resource compiler provides an implementation of the
safety checks associated with abstract resource operations. The platform compiler uses
the platform interface to produce replacement versions of the Win32 system DLLs that
incorporate that safety checking. The application transformer modifies applications so they
use those replacement versions, and performs the protective transformations described in
Chapter 5. This chapter describes each stage of the policy transformations of Naccio/Win32.
4.1 Resource Compilation
The code that implements resource operations and their associated safety checking is au-
tomatically generated from the resource and policy descriptions introduced in Section 2.2.
The same platform-independent parsing and analyses as in any Naccio implementation are
performed, followed by Win32-specific code generation to produce the resource implemen-
tations and analysis results needed by the platform compiler.
To maximize the generality and portability of the Win32 code-generator, the code
produced is standard ANSI C. Resource types and operations can be handled by standard
syntax through naming and argument conventions. These conventions must be followed
by the generated resource code and the platform interface. Many of these conventions can
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typedef struct _RFile {
String name;
} *RFile;
typedef struct _RFileSystem {
long bytes-written;
} *RFileSystem;
extern RFileSystem RFileSystemstate;
void RFileSystemopwrite(RFileSystem this, RFile file, int nbytes);
#define RFileSystemwrite(file,nbytes) \\
RFileSystemop-write(RFileSystem__state, file,nbytes)
Figure 4-1: Excerpts of auto-generated resource header code
be hidden by #def ine and typedef statements located in an automatically generated
header file that provides a type name for the resource and function prototypes for the various
resource functions. Each resource has a corresponding s truc t declaration that contains
the resource state introduced by the safety policy. Each resource operation corresponds to a
DLL function that contains C implementations of the policy checking code. Function names
encode the resource type as a prefix, and take the resource object as their first argument.
Global resources are implemented using a single global variable that holds the state of the
global resource and is passed as first argument to resource operations. This maximizes
commonality with code for non-global resources and thus eases translation. The generated
resource code defines macros as shown in Figure 4-1, allowing platform interface code as
well as resource code to call global resource operations without knowledge of this global
state variable.
Resource operations declared to be performed once at the initiation or termination of
the application are placed into the DLL functions that the Windows loader already runs
automatically at such times, so that the appropriate checking code is guaranteed to be run
appropriately.
Generating the body of the functions that implement resource operations is a straightfor-
ward process of combining and translating code fragments. Some of the more complicated
pieces of functionality, such as raising safety violations or requesting external information
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(such as the size of a file), are provided by the Naccio library. It includes standard data types
and functions for use by policies, implemented separately on each platform. For Windows,
the Naccio library is provided as a header file and a DLL that provides the needed functions.
It provides data type definitions like the String type used by the RFile declaration in
Figure 4-1, allowing the code-generator to be independent of the specific implementation
of those data types.
Some code that is not directly based on the resource and policy descriptions must
be generated in resource DLLs in order to handle memory allocation, synchronization,
or functionality needed by the protective transformations. Such code can be included
in new virtual resource operations introduced by the resource compiler and used by the
platform interface. Memory allocation, for instance, is handled by explicit constructor
and destructor functions for each resource, which must be called at appropriate times by
the platform interface. The code for these operations will be automatically generated and
combined with any constructor or finalizer code included in the resource description. Using
these operations rather than explicit allocate and free procedures in the platform interface
allows the resources to perform reference counting or automatic memory management if
desirable. In addition it allows more control over where and how resource objects are
allocated, which is useful for some of the protective transformations described in Section
5.2.
Synchronization is another important issue in multithreaded environments such as
Win32. It is important that access to resource data be synchronized so that safety checking
cannot be circumvented due to race conditions when multiple threads attempt to access
the same resource simultaneously. Since knowing where to insert synchronization is a
difficult problem to solve automatically, the responsibility of synchronization lies with the
platform interface author. The resource implementation provides support for this in the
form of acquire and release operations automatically generated for each resource. These
operations access a synchronization object included in each resource object (as well as each
global resource) to lock the object or resource for exclusive use by the calling thread. The
wrappers must lock a resource object before calling any operation that could generate race
conditions, and unlock the object after the operation (or set of operations) is complete.
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Great care should be taken to avoid deadlock conditions when multiple locks are acquired,
and to avoid potential vulnerabilities introduced by insufficient synchronization.
The current prototype implementation of Naccio/Win32 does not include synchroniza-
tion. Hence, it is vulnerable to race-condition attacks in multithreaded environments.
4.2 Platform Interface and Platform Compilation
The platform compiler produces the policy-enforcing library used by transformed applica-
tions. This library consists of a replacement for each of the system DLLs that provide the
functions of the Win32 API. The platform interface describes the behavior of the Win32
API functions in terms of abstract resources. The platform compiler uses that description
to generate wrappers that apply safety checking.
The format of the platform interface files is designed to make the generation of platform
DLLs as simple as possible while allowing platform interface authors a sufficient degree of
flexibility and clarity. Since the platform interface is written only once by an expert, it is
acceptable for it to be somewhat difficult to read and write. The simplest way to do this is
to directly provide the source code for the wrapper functions, either in C or in a stylized
language translated to C by the platform compiler. Annotations, either in that source code or
in a different location, can provide information that would be difficult to provide in source
code, such as the name of the DLL being described, lists of functions to be wrapped, and
any hints the optimizer may require to eliminate unnecessary code in wrappers.
Compiling wrapper source code into DLLs suitable for replacing the Win32 system
DLLs requires two other pieces of special support: name management and support for
standard wrappers. Name management is required to allow the wrapper DLL to appear
identical to the system DLL that it replaces. It must export all of the functions in the system
DLL using the same names. The wrapper functions, however, may need to call the actual
API functions, so they cannot have the same names in the source code as the functions they
replace. The solution is for wrapper functions to be named internally by adding a standard
prefix (wrapper_) to the name of the function they replace. As the compiled code is linked
into a final DLL, the linker is instructed to construct the export table to include function
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names without the prefix.
Linker directives also enable a performance-saving option in the case of null wrappers.
Null wrappers occur whenever an API function does not manipulate any resources regulated
by the safety policy. In such cases, it would be desirable to simply allow the untrusted
program to call this API function directly. This can be accomplished using forwarding.
Forwarding allows the function pointer normally stored in a DLL's export table to be
replaced by a string containing the name of an alternate DLL and a function within that
alternate DLL. At load time, references to the forwarded function are fixed to use the DLL
and function referenced by that string. Thus with only a very small additional cost at
load-time, all potential run-time cost associated with null wrappers is eliminated.
Since the number of exported functions in the system DLLs is large, and many may
not need to be handled as part of a platform interface (if they do not affect protected
resources) the platform interface author specifies which functions must receive special
handling (such as wrapping) while remaining functions receive some default handling
specified by the platform interface. Usually the default is either that they are allowed
unmodified as described above, or disallowed entirely by forwarding to a violation function.
The second piece of special support for the creation of replacement DLLs is the in-
clusion of standardized wrapper code that is not part of the platform interface. Such code
might be required to support the replacement of DLLs or the protective transformations, and
may come in two types. The first is functions that must have special functionality. For in-
stance, all Naccio transformed programs will require wrapper code for the LoadLibrary
function to ensure that wrapper DLLs are loaded appropriately. If the platform interface
itself does not include a wrapper for LoadLibrary, then the application of the standard
wrapper is as simple as linking with a library that contains it. If, however, a wrapper is
required for LoadLibrary both for the protection of resources, and for the standard func-
tionality required by Naccio itself, then the code for these two wrappers must be combined.
Automatically combining the two functions into one would be complicated, so standard
wrappers are provided to platform interface authors as source code in the same format as
the platform interface. If they are not modified then they will simply remain in the platform
interface file unchanged. Otherwise, the platform author can choose either to modify the
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standard wrapper, or to write a new wrapper that then calls the standard wrapper instead of
the true API function. The latter method is best because it makes it easier for new standard
wrappers to be provided and added to the platform interface.
This mechanism is sufficient since the number of functions requiring standard wrappers
should be minimal. This is not the case of standard code at the entry or exit points of
wrapped functions that might be required by the protective transformations. Such code
could be required to unlock protected regions of memory needed by the Win32 API as part
of the memory protection described in Section 5.2, or to perform stack relocation as part
of the more advanced protective transformations suggested in Section 5.2.2. In this case
the platform compiler automatically combines this functionality with that of the wrappers
generated from the platform interface. This combination only requires the insertion of code
at function entry and exit points, and is thus easily performed either through rewriting of
source code, or by direct editing of instructions.
Once all the replacement DLLs have been produced, they make up the policy-enforcing
system library that is the key output of the policy compiler. They must be stored where
they can be loaded by transformed applications, and named so that they can be found and
associated with the correct policy. The platform compiler also produces a policy description
file used by the application transformer. This file contains the location of the replacement
DLLs, and lists of which DLLs should be considered a part of the platform library. It can
also list DLLs should be allowed to remain untransformed because they were determined
by the platform interface author not to affect protected resources.
4.3 Application Transformation
Once the resource and policy compilers have been run for a given policy, all that remains
is to modify an application so that it uses the policy-enforcing library and cannot bypass
or alter safety checks. To do this, Naccio/Win32 alters import tables so the application
will use the policy-enforcing DLLs. Since the methods of linking to DLLs are simple
and processor-independent, wrappers can be applied efficiently and quickly. Most of the
effort required of the application transformer is in performing the protective transformations
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described in Chapter 5.
Before any transformation can take place, though, the application transformer must
identify the code that must be modified. The application transformer is run by providing
the name of the application executable, and optionally of any additional DLLs that should
be be included as part of the application. The transformer then examines the import tables
of these files to find which DLLs they link implicitly, and continues this process recursively
on those DLLs to produce a complete list of DLLs linked implicitly by the application.
The name of each system DLL used by the application is replaced by the corresponding
policy-enforcing DLL. The application executable and all DLLs it uses (except system
DLLs) are considered untrusted code and are transformed accordingly. This means that
any libraries (such as the C runtime library) that were statically linked into the application
executable will be transformed as well.
Applications are transformed to use the policy-enforcing DLLs when linking implicitly
simply by replacing all references to Win32 API DLLs with references to corresponding
wrapper DLLs produced by the policy compiler. The is performed by simply changing an
ASCII string in the import table. After any import table modification, the executable or
DLL must be re-bound (using the BIND utility or the BindImage function as described
in Section 3.1) to ensure that function entry point addresses are updated, since those in the
replacement DLL may not be identical to those in the original DLL.
It is not, in general, possible to statically determine all of the DLLs used by an application
because of explicit DLL linking. Explicitly linked DLLs can be manually specified to the
transformer, or handled by the standard wrapper on the LoadLibrary function. That
wrapper substitutes policy-enforcing versions of any explicitly linked system DLLs at
run-time. Explicitly linked application DLLs that remain untransformed either result in a
violation, or in the invocation of the transformer at run-time.
The redirection of DLL linking is simple and efficient, and can be performed inde-
pendently of the protective transformations. Once both have been applied, the application
transformer simply outputs the modified executable and DLLs. The user can run the trans-
formed application normally, and should notice no difference until the first time a policy
violation occurs (and data is saved from harm by the Naccio protections).
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Chapter 5
Protective Transformations
Protective transformations are necessary to prevent an untrusted program from bypassing or
compromising the policy-enforcing platform library. The wrappers provide protection based
on the use of that library, but cannot provide protection if the proper calling conventions
of that library are not enforced, or if the program modifies system resources in ways that
do not use the policy-enforcing library. The protective transformations must guarantee that
such behavior is not possible.
The key categories of program behavior that must be avoided in order to ensure this:
1. Direct Kernel or LPC Calls: The DLLs that implement the Win32 API do so (in the
case of Windows NT) either by making calls to the NT Kernel, or by passing local
procedure call (LPC) messages to the Win32 protected subsystem. If an untrusted
program is allowed to use either of these techniques in its own code, it can bypass the
policy-enforcing API calls and manipulate resources directly.
2. Calls to Unmodified DLLs: Even if appropriate API calls and link information
are modified to replace API DLLs with their policy-enforcing version, the original
version of each DLL is still usually loaded into the application's address space so that
it can be used by the wrappers themselves. If untrusted code can determine or guess
the location at which the DLL is loaded and make calls directly to it, then it could
bypass the wrapper-based protections.
3. Self-Modifying Code: All Naccio protections are based on the examination and
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transformation of code before run-time. If code could be modified at run-time,
then the protections can be bypassed. Dangerous self-modifying code includes the
modification of code already transformed (or code included in safety checking), as
well as the construction of new code that is then executed.
4. Modification of Policy State: Most safety policies maintain some state (such as the
number of bytes written to a file) that they update appropriately and use to perform
safety checks. Untrusted code must be prevented from directly modifying this data.
5. Modification of Win32 API Private Data: Some of the Win32 API functions
themselves maintain data in the application's memory, which while it is safe from
the point of view of the operating system, could be modified in such a way as to alter
the behavior of the API functions and thus invalidate the platform interface. In such
cases, this data must also be protected from untrusted code.
6. Modification of Local Data of Trusted Code: In a multithreaded program, it could
be the case that trusted code (such as safety checking and API functions) is running
in parallel with untrusted code in another thread. The local data used by the trusted
code is stored on its thread's stack, located in the application's memory. If untrusted
code is allowed to modify this data, it could alter the behavior of trusted code in ways
that could compromise checking, allowing undetected policy violations.
Each of these behaviors is dangerous from the standpoint of policy enforcement. Each is
also rarely present in well-behaved programs. Properly written programs should perform all
system functions by using the appropriate API calls, and should not attempt to modify data
not specifically allocated to them. Self-modifying code is rarely used by non-malicious
programs. Any attempt to control the above behaviors in a way that allowed them in
some cases but not in others, rather than disallowing them entirely, would likely be very
complicated and error-prone, and have a correspondingly high cost in robustness and
performance. Thus, it seems reasonable to completely disallow all of the behaviors above,
at least in cases that cannot be easily determined to be non-dangerous. The number of
well-behaved applications that cannot be supported as a result is expected to be small.
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Direct kernel and LPC calls can be disallowed through static analysis. During the
protective transformation phase, the untrusted executable is scanned for code that makes
such calls. Kernel calls are easy to detect, since they require special instructions to make a
trap to the system kernel. Kernel traps that can be guaranteed to be safe can be allowed to
remain, but any others will be replaced by instructions that cause a violation to be raised.
LPC calls are more complicated, but can still be detected and handled in the same way.
The other listed behaviors can be separated into two categories, and the enforcement
mechanisms used to avoid them similarly separated into two parts. If Naccio is able to
monitor and control the code that may be executed, then it can prevent direct calls to illegal
DLLs, or the construction and execution of arbitrary code in data areas. Modification of
already existing code is a case of the modification of restricted data, as are the remainder
of the listed behaviors. The rest of this chapter is divided between the two categories
of enforcement mechanisms that make up the majority of the protective transformations:
control-flow and memory safety. The current prototype implementation of Naccio/Win32
does not include the protective transformations, so some aspects of this design are as yet
untested.
5.1 Control-Flow Safety
In the presence of code such as indirect jumps', the control-flow of a program cannot always
be completely determined statically. Thus, run-time checks are needed to avoid illegal
control-flow behavior. Naccio makes use of Software-Based Fault Isolation (SFI) [37], a
technique that limits control-flow and memory access by transforming code. Details of SFI
are described in Section 5.1.1.
Naccio/Win32 uses a limited form of SFI that transforms only jump instructions (al-
ternate mechanisms used to control memory access are described in Section 5.2). These
transformations limit the legal targets of any transformed jump to a single region of mem-
ory. The way that this is accomplished is described in Section 5.1.2. Naccio/Win32 uses
'Instructions that transfer control to a location determined at run-time based on the contents of a register
or memory location. Such instructions are often used as part of the compilation of procedure calls and switch
statements.
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this functionality to limit the control-flow of the code in any executable or DLL to its code
segment, which is produced as a single region by nearly all Win32 compilers. 2
This prevents the application from constructing code outside of its code segment, but
Naccio must still prevent the application from modifying code within its code segment. To
avoid this, the code segment must remain read-only. This is accomplished using virtual
memory protection. 3 Since applications are normally able to freely modify the virtual
memory protection on their code segment, untrusted code must be prevented from doing so
by wrappers on virtual memory routines, as part of the memory safety described in Section
5.2.
Once control-flow has been restricted to an executable or DLL's code segment the only
other difficulty is to allow control to leave that code segment at valid times, such as calls
to legal DLL functions. The method by which this is allowed is described in Section 5.1.3,
after the details of the control-flow limitations.
5.1.1 SF1 Background 4
Software-Based Fault Isolation transforms a program to limit the regions of memory that it
can read and write, and from which it can execute instructions. SFI imposes its limitations by
replacing the three basic types of instructions that access memory - write, read (optionally),
and jump instructions - with sequences of instructions to perform checking on the target
address before performing the write, read, or jump. Only those instructions whose address
cannot be determined at transform-time must be protected with run-time checks so that
the address can be checked at run-time after it is calculated. Since the three types of
instructions are transformed separately, the memory segments to which they are limited
can be different, and often are. SFI usually presupposes that code and data segments are
separate so that all addresses in the code segment can be assumed to correspond to legal,
transformed instructions.
2 1f an application has multiple code segments, they must be combined by the transformer to avoid the
difficulties of checking control-flow between different code segments.
3The Win32 API does support separate execute permissions, but most processors make no distinction
between read and execute access, so this feature cannot be utilized.
4 Much of the detail here is based on [37], [29], and [30], which include more complete details of SFI.
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The two most common forms that the SFI checking instructions take are segment
matching and sandboxing. Segment matching performs fault detection by comparing the
high bits of the address in use to those of the legal memory segment, and branching to a
special violation routine if needed. Sandboxing simply uses bitmasks to set the high bits
of the memory address to those of the legal segment. As opposed to fault detection, this is
known as fault avoidance. If transformed code attempts to access an illegal address it will
not result in any visible violation. Instead, the access will be redirected to some arbitrary
address within the legal segment. This could cause the code to have unpredictable behavior,
but this behavior is still guaranteed not to access illegal memory. Sandboxing is a more
efficient solution because the sequence of instructions that it uses is shorter.
Since every instruction included in the checking increases the overhead introduced,
optimizations that reduce the number of inserted instructions are desirable. A notable
example is the use of guard zones. Many processors include instructions that access
memory using the value of a register combined with a fixed offset, typically with a small
possible range of values. For the target address to be checked, this offset must be added to
the value in the register before checking is attempted. This added computation can, however,
be avoided if the legal memory segment is surrounded by guarded zones of memory as large
as the possible value of the fixed offset. Using the operating system's virtual memory
protection, these zones can be made to cause hardware address faults any time an address
within them is accessed. That fault can be detected by the trusted container application and
reported as a violation. Once these guard zones are in place, checking instructions must
only test the contents of the register itself, trusting that no fixed offset could make a legal
address in the register into an address beyond the guard zones.
An important aspect of SFI is the need for dedicated registers. A typical SFI system
needs approximately five registers that cannot be used in any untrusted code. The reason
for this is the ability of untrusted code to jump to the final instruction in the sequence of
instructions created by SFI, bypassing the checking instructions before it. The standard
solution to this is for the final instruction of the checking sequence to use a specially
dedicated register. Since untrusted code cannot use this register directly it is guaranteed to
always contain a legal address, and jumps past the checking instructions thus cannot allow
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access to illegal addresses. One dedicated register is needed for each memory segment in
use, and additional dedicated registers are needed to store the segment address itself, and
the bitmasks used to examine or clear specified bits in checking instructions. The use of
dedicated registers has been shown to have only a small performance penalty on processors
with many general-purpose registers. On those with few, including the Intel x86, it is likely
that dedication of five registers would be prohibitively expensive.
An alternative to the dedicated registers of traditional SF1 is to limit jump instructions
not simply to a single memory segment, but to known valid targets. All that is required
to eliminate the need for dedicated registers is to ensure that the SFI address-checking
instructions are not legal targets, but additional restrictions can also be applied. This
was done by MiSFIT [30], which redirected all jump instructions to a specialized routine
that compared their target against a list of known valid target addresses. The valid target
addresses were calculated as part of code generation, and augmented by new function
addresses introduced by dynamic linking. MiSFIT's control-flow safety has significantly
higher overhead than that of traditional SFI, but far lower overhead than that which would
be introduced by five dedicated registers on a register-poor processor such as the x86.
Once SFI has been used to limit control-flow to a single code segment, the remaining
difficulty is allowing it to pass out of that code segment in legal ways. The method usually
used to do this is called remote procedure call (RPC). To make an RPC call the untrusted
code sets up argument values in registers or memory, and jumps to one of several RPC stubs
within its code segment. The stub contains a jump instruction using a fixed address, which
allows control-flow to pass out of the code segment to an appropriate RPC routine. The
RPC routine checks argument values, and possibly copies data from the untrusted code's
memory into other regions. When the RPC call is complete, the RPC routine must copy
return-values back, and check that dedicated registers are in legal states before jumping
back to the return address, which must also be checked to be within the untrusted code's
legal code segment.
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5.1.2 Use of SFI in Naccio/Win32
The Naccio/Win32 protective transformations use a variant of SFI that differs from tradi-
tional SF1 in several ways. The differences exist purely as performance enhancements, since
standard SFI can provide all the required guarantees. First, since memory protection in
Naccio/Win32 is handled by separate memory protection mechanisms (described in Section
5.2) SF1 is only applied to jump instructions. The lack of the need to apply SFI to memory
access instructions also allows for an optimization that eliminates the need for dedicated
registers.
The alteration is to replace indirect jump instructions by fixed jumps to specialized
routines, in a way very similar to normal RPC mechanisms. These routines are located
outside of the code segment, but do not contain any code beyond the normal SFI checking
(either fault detection or fault avoidance). The difference is that rather than utilizing a
dedicated register, the target address is maintained in the original register. The reason
that this can be done safely is that these routines are located outside of the code segment.
Thus there is no danger of untrusted code successfully jumping directly to the final jump
instruction, and thus there need be no assurance that the register used as the target contains
a valid address at all times.
One such routine is provided for each possible target register (differing also based on
whether that register holds the address, or a pointer to the address in memory), and jump
instructions are rewritten accordingly. Indirect jump instructions that utilize a fixed offset
can be handled by the use of guard zones as described in the previous section, and the
load address of the executable's code segment can be adjusted appropriately to ensure that
sufficient space for the guard pages is available. Windows' virtual memory system provides
the ability to create guarded pages, access to which causes an exception, which will result
in the running of a violation routine defined by Naccio.
The checking performed by these routines can usually be the same as that of standard
SF1 (either sandboxing or segment matching). Some programs may require some special
checking on the x86 platform. This is because unlike most platforms to which SFI has
previously been applied, x86 has variable-length instructions that need not be aligned
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on 32-bit boundaries. Thus it is possible for the same set of bytes to be interpreted as
either a constant value included in a previous instruction, or as the start of an instruction,
depending on the jump that reached those bytes. If that embedded instruction is a potentially
dangerous one, such as an indirect jump or the halt instruction, then jumps to it must not
be allowed5 . This contradicts the normal assumption that all code in the code segment is
legal. The dangerous instruction cannot be transformed without invalidating its use as a
constant in the preceding instruction. Cases where dangerous instructions are hidden in
this way can, however, be detected statically. Programs with no such hidden instructions
can be transformed to use normal SFI checking. Those which do have such instructions
must perform some extra checking. MiSFIT's checking based on a list of legal addresses
avoids the problem, but requires significant cost for building and checking the list. In the
likely case that only a very small number of hidden dangerous instructions exist, it will
be much more efficient to perform normal SFI checking, and then explicitly check each
address against a list of illegal addresses that correspond to hidden instructions. In cases
where there are many such instructions, MiSFIT-like checking can be performed, or no-op
instructions can be inserted or other transformations performed to avoid use of the hidden
instruction. It is believed that such cases will be very rare, since the number instructions
considered dangerous is very limited.
Naccio's optimized form of SFI is suitable only forjump instructions due to performance
concerns. In standard SFI, an indirect jump instruction is replaced by some number of
checking instructions, followed by a similar indirect jump instruction. In this system it
is replaced by a jump to a fixed address, which will be followed at run-time by the same
checking instructions and eventual indirect jump. The address can be fixed, so it will
not cause any additional penalty on modern processors such as pipeline stalls or branch-
prediction failures. The total overhead is thus likely to be only one instruction-cycle
(though instruction cache performance could be affected as well). On x86 in particular, this
overhead is significantly less than the likely overhead of dedicating one or more registers.
5As with other dangerous behavior such as self-modifying code, Naccio/Win32 makes no attempt to
support programs that attempt to use dangerous instructions hidden in this way. The class of programs
disallowed by this is likely to be very small indeed.
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An additional benefit is that since on most architectures direct and indirect jump instructions
have equal width, no instruction relocations will be required to replace the instructions. In
fact, the increase in code size is fixed to the size of the address-checking routines, rather
than variable due to the insertion of instructions at every indirect jump.
Applying this method of SFI to memory instructions would be inappropriate for several
reasons. First, indirect memory instructions (i.e. pointer access) are much more frequent
than indirect jumps, so the overhead of the extra instruction would be less effectively coun-
terbalanced by the elimination of the fixed overhead of dedicated registers. Additionally,
even RISC architectures often have several types of indirect memory instructions (such as
8-bit, 16-bit, and 32-bit versions), requiring a larger number of address-checking routines to
be inserted. On CISC architectures such as the x86, where memory access can be performed
as a portion of more complicated instructions (such as arithmetic operations or multi-byte
copies), there are even more possibilities to handle.
Applying this optimization to jump instructions, though, simplifies the application of
SFI to Naccio/Win32 and reduces the associated performance penalty. The remaining
details are identical to standard SFI implementations, and provide the same functionality,
as required for the overall strategy of control-flow safety in the protective transformations.
5.1.3 Non-Local Control-Flow
SFI forces jumps to remain within a single code segment, thus eliminating illegal DLL calls,
and self-modifying code (since the code segment will be enforceably read-only). Like any
SFI system Naccio/Win32 must have some method of allowing legal transfers of control
out of the code segment. DLL calls represent the only legal jumps out of the code region,
and must receive special handling. Jumps to implicitly linked DLLs will all be in the form
of indirect jumps via addresses stored in the IAT (described in Section 3.1), and are thus
easy to recognize. The IAT resides in read-only memory (enforceable by Naccio memory
protection) so it cannot be modified after the loader runs. Thus the IAT can contain only
valid DLL entry points based on the import and export tables already adjusted by the policy
transformations, and thus implicitly linked DLL calls are known to be safe without further
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modifications.
Explicitly linked DLLs, and the associated jumps to procedure pointers returned by
GetProcAddress, are a far more difficult problem. This can be accomplished by
applying a wrapper to GetProcAddress that returns the address of a pre-prepared
stub routine inside the code segment that dispatches to the appropriate point outside the
code segment. A different stub can be used for each explicitly-linked function, and the
wrapper to GetProcAddress must simply cause the stub code to jump to the appropriate
location by storing the DLL address in a protected memory location used by the jump in
the stub. This essentially creates a dynamic IAT for explicitly linked DLLs, which the
GetProcAddress wrapper is capable of modifying because it is considered trusted code
by the Naccio/Win32 memory protections.
The number of stubs needed is equal to the maximal number of explicitly-linked func-
tions active at once. If the number of explicitly linked functions at run-time exceeded the
number of stubs, an error would result. Since stubs are small (only a few instructions) it is
possible to create many of them, with the actual number set at transform-time. Stubs can be
re-used if the DLL containing the corresponding function is unloaded. In fact, stubs must
be either re-used or cleared in this situation, lest the remaining stub be used to jump to a no
longer legal memory address.
Returns from DLL functions are also a valid jump out of a code segment. Since
wrapper DLLs are not transformed by the protective transformations, the only relevant
DLL returns are those from DLL functions in application DLLs. On processors that use
dedicated return instructions, these can be handled by another address-checking routine
outside the code segment. It would differ from others in that it would consider addresses
in any application code segment to be legal (a list of such segments can be provided by the
application transformer for implicitly linked DLLs, and extended by the LoadLibrary
wrapper for explicitly linked DLLs). If the processor has no dedicated return instruction,
then any indirect jump instruction could theoretically be used for a DLL return. In this case,
the checking of alternate code segments must be performed for any target address that is
found to be outside of the active code segment. This introduces no additional overhead for
DLL returns (since the current code segment would have to be checked anyway to handle
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internal procedure returns), and for other instructions it only requires that fault detection,
rather than fault avoidance be used, so that "illegal" addresses result in a branch that can
lead to further checking, rather than simply to an incorrect address somewhere in the legal
code segment.
5.2 Memory Safety
Naccio's protective transformations must protect many types of data in memory, including
policy state, the state of API routines themselves, code segments of both trusted and
untrusted code, and the local data of threads running trusted code. Since an application
normally can read and write all of its own memory, Naccio/Win32 must make certain
regions of memory non-writable by untrusted code, but writable to trusted code. Reading
such memory could be disallowed as well, but it is unlikely that the risks introduced by
reads are significant enough to justify the additional cost and complexity.
One solution would be to apply full SFI to all untrusted code in order to control their
memory writes as well as their control-flow. Since the memory access of untrusted code
must be limited by the protection of several regions, rather than by limitation to a single
region, the SF1 method applied would be more complicated than those explored in most
previous work, and would be likely to have a higher performance overhead.
Instead, Naccio/Win32 takes advantage of the Windows operating system's virtual mem-
ory protection features and the existing wrapper mechanism to produce a more efficient
solution. It uses virtual memory protection to mark the guarded regions of memory as read-
only, and uses wrappers to enforce that access restriction. This can be done simply and
efficiently, and in a way that depends only on the Win32 API, unlike the processor-specific
SFI transformations. The primary shortcoming of this solution is that it can provide guar-
anteed protection only in a single-threaded program. Section 5.2.1 presents this solution,
while Section 5.2.2 discusses the issues raised by multithreading and describes possible
systems for multithreaded memory safety in Naccio/Win32. Multithreaded memory safety
for Win32 is considered an open issue, and thus no particular solution is included in the
current Naccio/Win32 design. Instead, several possible solutions are presented, and future
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investigation will reveal which can provide the best protection at the lowest cost.
5.2.1 Single-Thread Memory Protection
In an environment with only a single thread of control within a process, Naccio's memory
safety can be based entirely on virtual memory protection and specialized wrappers on
memory-access routines, with no direct transformations of user code required. Win32 pro-
vides page-based memory protection, but allows applications to freely change the protection
level on their own memory. Thus, except in the case of shared resources (on which permis-
sions are enforced), memory access permissions act only as a safeguard against program
bugs, rather than an impediment to a hostile program. Since all modifications to memory
protections must be performed through the use of API calls, however, Naccio can control an
untrusted program's ability to change the permissions on its memory. This method could
be used to enforce read-only access on memory pages containing data that should not be
changed by untrusted code, by raising violations if an untrusted program attempts to enable
write access to those pages. Read access could also be disallowed by this method if desired.
Since code generated by Naccio can make calls to API routines without going through
wrappers, it can freely enable write access when necessary. Vital memory regions can thus
be kept read-only when user code executes, and changed temporarily to read-write when
API or checking code needs to modify data. This requires frequent calls to the API routines
that change memory protection, which have an associated overhead due to the kernel call
involved. If the locking and unlocking of memory access is properly placed, this overhead
should not be needed at all for read access, but only when writes must be performed.
Since reads and writes can be performed by policy-specific code, the placement of these
locking and unlocking calls is performed by an automated analysis based on the analysis
data provided by the resource compiler.
Unlocking and relocking of memory used by the API functions themselves must be
performed by wrappers. The code to do so is automatically inserted at the entry and exit
points of wrapper code as described in Section 4.2 with no need for intervention by the
author of the platform interface. API functions that could previously be passed through
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with no wrapper may require a wrapper for the purpose of this form of memory protection.
The identification of memory to be protected can be done relatively easily. All code
segments must be protected. All data used by resource checks can be stored in a single heap
and that heap's region of memory protected. In some cases, data used by the API itself can
also be stored in that heap by changing the default heap location before API functions are
called. Some API functions may use writable regions of DLL code, and those must also be
detected and protected. The existence of these regions can be determined by examination
of API documentation and the DLL files themselves, and is a part of the supplemental data
provided in the platform interface.
The reason that this solution cannot support multiple threads is that it is time-based
(requiring no untrusted code to run when protected memory is unlocked) and provides no
protection for local data on the stack (since it is not vulnerable except when trusted and
untrusted code run simultaneously). The issues surrounding multithreading and memory
protection in Naccio are currently under investigation, and described in the next section. The
single threaded solution, however, is applicable in many situations. Its primary advantage
is its simplicity and its independence of the underlying processor type. Many Win32
applications use only a single thread, particularly command-line based application. If
Naccio/Win32 or a similar system were to be applied to helper applications such as applets
downloaded from the Web, then limiting code to a single thread would be a reasonable
way to save complexity and performance. This single thread limitation can be enforced
by wrappers on the API functions that create new threads. In addition, while Win32 is a
thread-based architecture, many modem operating systems (including most UNIX variants)
use a process-based architecture where multithreading would not be an issue. It is likely
that a simple variant of this single-thread memory protection system would be sufficient for
Naccio implementations for those operating system platforms.
5.2.2 Multithreading Issues
Multithreading in Win32 allows multiple threads of control to exist within a single appli-
cation. The threads are scheduled separately, but share a single address space. This makes
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sharing information between threads efficient, but foregoes some of the additional protec-
tions that can be provided by the operating system between processes. For cooperative
and well-behaved threads, which make proper use of synchronization primitives to avoid
race conditions, the performance and simplicity benefits of threads often outweigh the dan-
gers. In Naccio/Win32, however, trusted or untrusted code, and protected or unprotected
data can be used by different threads simultaneously. This presents a number of potential
race-condition based vulnerabilities:
" The locking and unlocking mechanisms used by the memory protection system de-
scribed in the previous section relies on only trusted code being able to access
protected memory while it is unlocked. The ability to write to protected memory
must be unlocked before trusted code performs a write, and relocked before untrusted
code is run again. If untrusted code is running simultaneously, it may be able to
modify a piece of protected memory while it is unlocked on behalf of trusted code.
" The local data of a thread, stored on its stack (one of which is allocated for each
thread) is not protected at all by the single-thread memory protection scheme. Since
alteration of this data could affect the execution of trusted code, untrusted code cannot
be allowed to modify it while trusted code is running.
" Threads are not protected from each other in any way. This includes the ability
of one thread to modify another thread's context, including its program counter,
stack pointer, and register values. Unchecked usage of these capabilities could allow
untrusted code to modify the behavior of trusted code in another thread, or to cause
illegal code to be executed by another thread.
The last of these issues can be easily dealt with by wrappers applied to Win32 API
functions. The other vulnerabilities must be avoided by the protective transformations.
The rest of this section describes possible methods for extending the capabilities of the
Naccio/Win32 memory safety mechanisms to provide protection for multithreaded appli-
cations. Not all of the suggested solutions provide all of the necessary protections when
used alone, but a combination of them would create a sufficiently secure system. There has
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not as yet been sufficient investigation or testing to know which of these solutions would
be best, or which (if any) would be capable of providing the required protections with an
acceptable performance loss. An attempt is made in the descriptions below to predict the
benefits and pitfalls of each approach. SFI is the most promising approach, particularly
because application of more thorough SFI would be easy to integrate with the application
of control-flow SFI already performed by the application transformer.
Halting of untrusted threads would allow the time-based protections of the single-thread
memory safety scheme to be effective in a multithreaded environment. Each time trusted
code needs to have access to protected memory, it could halt all other threads to ensure that
it is the only code executing in the process. This could easily be accomplished through use
of the Win32 API, though care would have to be taken to ensure that arguments on the stack
could not be modified in a way that would cause the API calls to be ineffective.
While this solution would provide the required protection, it would limit the program
to a single thread whenever trusted code is modifying protected resources or performing
computations that would be susceptible to stack modification. If this included time spent
in long API functions performing 1/0, then one of the primary benefits of multithreading
would be lost. In addition, care would would have to be taken when applying this method
to avoid deadlock situations. For example, halting all other threads before a call to an API
routine that waited for the release of a synchronization object could cause the program to
halt indefinitely if that object was held by a halted thread.
SF1 could be applied to memory write instructions as well as jumps to enforce the required
memory restrictions. Since the limitations introduced are not as simple as a single legal
memory segment, the length of the sequence of checking instructions (and thus the overhead
introduced) would be higher than in standard SFI. In addition, as described in Section 5.1,
the optimized version of SFI used for control-flow safety is not well-suited to memory
protection. Thus providing write-based SFI in Naccio/Win32 would require either the use
of dedicated registers, or the use of specialized control-flow checking sequences (such as
those used by MiSFIT) that avoid the problems inherent in unrestricted jumps within the
code segment.
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Using SFI to protect local data in thread stacks is also possible if the checking code is
able to retrieve data about the current thread (available through the Win32 API). Checking
sequences can then consider the space allocated for the current thread's stack as a legal
memory segment, but all other thread stacks as illegal. Since this could reject some valid
programs that pass pointers to local data for temporary use by another thread, the checking
code could instead keep track of which treads are or are not executing trusted code, and
prohibit access to only the stacks of trusted threads. This would require some additional
work both by SFI checking sequences and by wrappers to keep track of trusted and untrusted
threads, but the additional overhead could potentially be much lower than that introduced
by other memory protection schemes.
Shared memory could be used to hold protected data, in order to take advantage of the
memory protection Windows enforces on shared memory regions. Protected data could be
stored in a shared segment mapped read-only into the application's memory space. Another
watchdog process, started with the application, would be able to write to that segment.
This solution allows reads to protected state to proceed with no additional overhead, while
writes to the segment would have to be performed via LPC messages passed to the watchdog
process. That LPC would introduce additional costs, but not much more than that introduced
by the unlocking and relocking used by the single-thread scheme.
The disadvantage of this scheme is that it provides no protection for thread stacks, and
may not be able to protect writable data in system DLLs if that data cannot be relocated into
the shared segment. The former problem can be avoided by moving portions of checking
code into the watchdog process. If all safety checks that would be susceptible to modifi-
cations of local data are performed outside the application process, then no interference is
possible. The inherent trade-off is that the process boundary must be crossed in cases even
when writes to the shared segment may not be required, and each crossing has an associated
cost. The severity of the problem presented by local DLL data cannot be known without a
more thorough inspection of the Win32 API DLLs. If such data must be protected, it may
be necessary to modify the system DLLs directly rather than simply using wrapper DLLs
to intercept system calls.
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Protected stacks can be used to reduce the difficulties introduced by stack data when
applying the schemes above. Rather than attempting to protect the stack data of threads at
all times, each thread could be allocated a region of protected memory (controlled by SFI
or some other method) to hold its stack when it is executing trusted code. At the entry point
of any trusted code that would be vulnerable to local data manipulation, the stack pointer
of the executing thread will be moved from the normal stack region to the protected region.
After the trusted code has completed running the pointer would be moved back. This can
be accomplished by code inserted at the entry and exit point of every relevant wrapper
function.
Trusted code written to take this into account can run normally using the protected
stack. If code not aware of the stack change must be run, any arguments passed on the stack
will need to be copied into this secure region so that they can be properly accessed. Any
modified data on the stack that will be visible to the callee (such as return values) must be
copied back to the original stack after the trusted code is complete. Copying must include
enough of the stack that any stack-relative accesses will be properly handled.
Additional copying may be needed in cases where non-stack data must be used by trusted
code in a way not tolerant of modifications. For instance, if checking must be performed
on the contents of a structure passed by pointer to an API call, then the entire structure
must be copied into protected memory so that its contents cannot be changed between the
time of the checking and the time of the API call. This process is similar to the copying
of arguments in RPC and kernel calls. The amount of copying required will be heavily
dependent on the API call and resources in question, so the platform interface author will
specify how memory objects must be copied to and from protected memory to provide
proper protection. Copying all data passed would be inefficient, or even impossible when
pointers are passed without knowledge of the amount of memory they may reference. The
platform interface author will know what data the API call must use, and whether resource
operations are dependent on that data, and can thus make the correct decision to perform
necessary copying without wasting effort on data that can remain in unprotected memory.
It is unknown whether the copying overhead of this approach would outweigh its benefits
when compared with SFI-based protection of thread stacks.
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Chapter 6
Prototype Implementation
The preceding chapters have presented the design of Naccio/Win32, but leave many details
unspecified. This chapter describes the current prototype implementation of Naccio/Win32,
which has been successfully tested on Windows NT on the x86 and Alpha platforms using
sample programs, including those described in Chapter 7. The primary purpose of this
prototype is as a proof of concept, and a tool for generating experimental results for the
investigation of the practicality of Naccio/Win32, as well as driving future work on Naccio.
Ease of implementation was a priority, thus the absolute performance of this implementation
is less than what could reasonably be accomplished. It is likely, however, that it displays
similar qualitative characteristics to a more complete implementation, and is thus a useful
tool for analysis of the soundness and usefulness of the Naccio/Win32 design.
The choices and details in the implementation of each of the major components of
Naccio/Win32 are described in the following sections. Limitations of the prototype imple-
mentation, which does not fully implement all of the features of the Naccio/Win32 design,
are described as well.
6.1 The Resource Compiler
The platform-independent portion of the Naccio/Win32 prototype is the same as that used
in the Naccio/JavaVM prototype described in [7]. The system is written in Java to allow it
to be run on any platform. The mechanisms for parsing, analyzing, and optimizing resource
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descriptions and safety policies are thus complete, and the only meaningful difference
introduced by Naccio/Win32 is the back-end that generates a resource implementation
suitable for the Windows platform.
This implementation is C source code, separated into a header file (RE SOURCE . H) and a
source file (RE SOURCE . C). Together they are compiled to a single DLL (RESOURCE . DL L)
containing entry points for all resource operations. The header file is then included by all
platform interface source files.
The header file contains type declarations for all resource state in the form of structures,
as well as function declarations for all resource operations and the compiler directives to
cause Microsoft Visual C++ to compile them as DLL exports. Function names follow the
conventions introduced in Section 4.1. The inclusion of this header by platform interface
sources allows for easy elimination of unnecessary calls to resource operations. When a
resource operation has been determined to have no effect, the resource compiler does not
produce a function declaration, but instead generates a macro definition with an empty
body. As a result, the preprocessor automatically eliminates calls to the resource operation
as platform interface sources are compiled.
The C file produced by the resource compiler contains implementations of resource
operations that perform meaningful work. Since the language used to define safety checks
is similar to C in its use of operators and functions (it is based on Java), the generation
of C code is straightforward. The Naccio library is implemented as a DLL and provides
most of the nontrivial functions called by checking code. The two areas in which nontrivial
translation is needed are resource objects and strings. Handling of resource objects is
merely a matter of syntax. Safety checking code uses Java-like conventions for access to
the state variables and operations of resources. Translating this to valid C requires only
replacing operators and automatically passing resource objects as the first argument to
resource operations.
The String data type utilized by safety checking code does not correspond to any
primitive C type. Safety checking treats a String as an immutable object, and performs
no explicit memory allocation or deallocation. A String is translated into a pointer to a
structure that contains a pointer to a character buffer, but also information about the size of
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that buffer, and whether the buffer is read-only (usually a string literal) or in heap-allocated
read/write memory. The reason for this is that the implementation data type is mutable, and
the implementation of some string operations takes advantage of this. The implementation
of resources also includes manual allocation and deallocation of Strings as part of the
translation process. The two available operations on a String in safety checking code are
assignment and concatenation, and both are implemented by special library functions called
by translated code. Temporary string variables used by these functions are allocated only
once at the beginning of a resource operation, and re-used to avoid unnecessary memory
allocation.
The only additional resource operations generated by the resource compiler proto-
type are the allocation operation (which includes safety checking code associated with
the constructor) and the deallocation operation (which includes code associated with the
finalize operation). These perform explicit allocation and deallocation, without any
form of automatic memory management such as garbage collection or reference counting.
The platform interface must ensure that a resource object is deallocated at the proper time.
No synchronization operations are generated by the resource compiler, and thus synchro-
nization of access to resource objects by multiple threads is not supported in the current
prototype. Due to the limitations of memory protection described in Section 5.2, the current
prototype only includes full support for applications with a single thread of control.
6.2 The Platform Compiler
The platform compiler and platform interface format for the Naccio/Win32 prototype were
designed to be simple to implement, while still allowing maximal flexibility on the part
of the platform-interface author to explore different possibilities. The platform interface
files are defined in a simple easily parsed format. They contain the names of functions
to be wrapped, disallowed entirely, or allowed unmodified, default behavior to take for
unmentioned functions, and the name of a C source file that is to be compiled to produce
the wrapper functions. This source file is provided directly by the platform interface author.
The prototype implementation does not perform any optimization of wrappers beyond that
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EXPORTS
DeleteFileA=wrapperDeleteFileA
MulDiv=KERNEL32 . MulDiv
DeleteFileW=NACCLIB. IllegalAPIViolation
Figure 6-1: Excerpt from the file KERNEL32 . DEF generated by the platform compiler
already provided by the resource header file. Thus there is no parsing or analysis of the
platform interface source code, which can simply be compiled by a standard C compiler.
The platform compiler runs the Microsoft Visual C++ compiler to create DLLs from
wrapper the source code. The appropriate linker directives are used for forwarding of
references to null wrappers, or forwarding of disallowed functions to violation functions.
This is performed through the use of a definition file that specifies all function names to be
exported. This file is automatically generated by the platform compiler.
Figure 6-1 shows an excerpt from the definition file for the policy-enforcing version
of KERNEL32 . DLL. It includes a single wrapped function (DeleteFileA, which corre-
sponds to the version of the function DeleteFile that takes the file name as an ASCII
string). It also includes a sample of the method of specifying forwarding for a null wrapper
(for the MulDiv function, which only performs mathematical operations and thus does not
effect resources) and for an illegal function (DeleteFileW, which is currently disallowed
due a lack of support for Unicode (wide-character) strings). The complete definition file
includes an entry of one of these three types for every function exported from the original
KERNEL32 .DLL.
Once the replacement DLLs are compiled, they are given the alternate extension .NPD
so that they can be distinguished from the true system DLLs by the loader'. These files
must be placed in a directory on the DLL search path so that they can be found. Since
only a single filename extension is currently used, and the application must find the proper
policy-enforcing DLLs in its search path at run-time, only a single policy can currently be
supported. Supporting multiple policies would require using a different extension for each
'In order to avoid the need to perform relocations of addresses in the executable (which as described in
Section 8.3 is a difficult and time-consuming task), it is desirable for the name of the wrapper DLL to have
the same length as that of the original DLL, so an alternate extension is used rather than a prefix or suffix.
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BOOL wrapperDeleteFileA(LPCTSTR lpFileName) {
RFile rf = addRFileByName(lpFileName);
RFileSystemdelete(rf);
RFileSystem_observeExists (rf);
releaseRFile (rf);
return(DeleteFileA(lpFileName));
Figure 6-2: Platform interface excerpt showing the wrapper code for DeleteFileA in
KERNEL32 .DLL. The A in the function name indicates that the argument string is ASCII.
BOOL and LPCTSTR are standard Windows data types (boolean, and pointer to constant
string, respectively).
policy, and specifying that extension in the policy description file.
6.3 The Platform Interface
The Win32 API is extensive, and not all of it is described by the platform interface included
in the prototype Naccio/Win32 implementation. The current platform interface includes
only wrappers involving file system access, corresponding to the RFileSystem and
RFile resources described in Section 2.2.1. The wrapper code for file-affecting API calls
was generated based on the Win32 API documentation included in the MSDN Library [19].
The platform interface must describe all ways in which API functions can affect resources.
The creation of a more complete platform interface is thus a matter of significant time and
effort, but not of any significant design difficulty.
The wrapper format uses the naming conventions of the resource operations to include
all Naccio-specific information. Figure 6-2 shows a sample wrapper, for the Win32 API
function to delete a file by name. The RFile data type has been declared by the header
file generated by the resource compiler. The appropriate RF ile Sys t em operations are
called: the dele te operation for the deletion itself, and the observeExis t s operation
representing the fact that the function will return an informative error value to the user code
if the named file does not exist. Noticing error behavior such as this provides one key
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difficulty in creating an accurate platform interface.
The addRFileByName and releaseRFile functions are defined in a helper DLL
(RFILEMAP.DLL). addRFileByName creates a new RFile object corresponding to
a file name, or returns an existing one if a resource object corresponding to the same
file has already been created elsewhere in the application. deleteRFile indicates that
this wrapper no longer needs the RFile object. The file map will determine whether
to deallocate the object, or maintain it because the file is still in use by the application,
for instance if the application had opened the file for writing elsewhere. (In this case the
deletion of the file by this API function is likely to cause an error, but since error handling
is part of the application's behavior, the wrapper does not interfere, and the file map will
maintain the RF ile object until the other handle to the file is closed.)
6.4 The Application Transformer
The current Naccio/Win32 implementation includes only the policy transformations de-
scribed in Chapter 4. The protective transformations described in Chapter 5 are not im-
plemented by the prototype. This means that while the current prototype can successfully
enforce policies on most Win32 applications, it would be vulnerable to targeted attacks.
In the absence of protective transformations, the work of the application transformer
is simple and fast. It simply examines import tables to find all application DLLs, and
then modifies those import tables to redirect DLL access. The policy description file
produced by the platform compiler contains a list of policy-enforcing DLLs, and those
are substituted for their originals by altering the filename extension. Non-wrapped system
DLLs (identified by their location in system directories) can either be allowed unmodified
or treated as application code by user choice. In order to avoid overwriting original files
and thus allow easy re-transformation, application DLLs are copied and given an alternate
extension (. NTD) before they are transformed. The application executable must retain its
original name to be able to be run identically, but it is backed up to an alternate extension
(.EXB) before transformation begins.
The last task of the application transformer is to provide information on the identity
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of policy-enforcing, application, and unmodified allowable DLLs for use by the standard
wrapper on the LoadLibrary function. It does this by producing a small source file
containing static arrays of the names of DLLs in the three categories, and compiling
that file into a DLL. At run-time, the LoadLibrary wrapper can use these arrays to
classify the names of DLLs that it must load. The purpose of including arrays in a DLL
rather than a data file of another sort is to minimize the run-time cost of loading the data.
Currently, the LoadLibrary wrapper signals a violation if an unknown DLL is loaded
rather than attempting to invoke the application transformer at run-time. The user can
manually re-transform the application, specifying the DLL from the violation message on
the command-line in order to include it in the transformation.
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Chapter 7
Results and Analysis
The Naccio/Win32 prototype has enforced a range of file system policies on a number
of Windows applications. Due to the limited nature of the current platform interface,
many large complex applications cannot be supported properly because they use the API
in unsupported ways or manipulate resources not included in the current prototype. The
prototype has, however, demonstrated its capabilities and performance with applications and
policies that fit within the currently (covered) subset of the API. Section 7.1 describes the
sample safety policies used to test the Naccio/Win32 prototype, while Section 7.2 describes
the sample applications that were transformed. Section 7.3 then presents performance
results generated running these samples with the Naccio/Win32 prototype.
7.1 Sample Policies
Current testing has been limited to policies that place limits on file system access. These
sample properties are not intended to illustrate a comprehensive set of Naccio/Win32
features, but simply as a useful set of examples for demonstration and testing purposes.
More realistic policies would combine these file system policies with protection for other
resources, such as the network.
The sample policies used to test Naccio/Win32 are described below. Except for the Nul l
and Combined policies, all policies used for testing included only a single safety property,
and thus the property name and its parameters are given here. Full policy descriptions for
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these policies are given in Appendix A.
Null performs no checking, but demonstrates the overhead required to enforce any policy.
LimitPath ("d: \\legal ") limits file system access to a single directory tree by
matching absolute filenames against a specified prefix. All resource operations
corresponding to file access require an RFile object as an argument, and those
objects are constructed only when a file is to be accessed, so the checking can be
performed in the constructor for RF il e resource objects. This minimizes the amount
of checking code needed at run-time.
ReadOnlyDir ("d:\\legal\\readonly") allows read access to a directory tree,
but disallows write access to it, again by comparing absolute filenames against the
specified prefix. Since a distinction must be made between reading and writing,
the constructor-based checking approach of LimitPath cannot be used. Instead,
checking code is attached to resource operations that correspond to opening a file for
writing, or modifying a file in ways other than writing (such as altering attributes).
No checking is required on the often-executed operations to write bytes into files,
however, since access must already have been checked when the file was opened.
NoOverwrite prohibits untrusted applications from modifying or replacing existing
files, as described in Section 2.3, but allows new files to be created. As is the case
with ReadOnlyDir, checking is needed only on operations that open existing files
for writing, and those that affect files directly
LimitBytesWritten (100000000) (described in Section 2.3) limits the number of
bytes that can be written to files to 100 million. The limit is set high for performance
testing to avoid violations.
Combined instantiates all of the properties described above (including LimitPath,
ReadOnlyDir, NoOverwrite, and LimitBytesWritten all with the argu-
ments given above) to enforce all of their restrictions at once.
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7.2 Sample Applications
Naccio/Win32 should be able to enforce policies on any Win32 application. Its current
platform interface, however, limits its support to applications that use the subset of the
Win32 API than is currently described. Resource manipulations performed through other
API functions cannot be constrained by the Naccio/Win32 prototype.
Though we expect Naccio/Win32 will be used primarily on interactive applications, the
sample applications chosen here are non-interactive. Run-time performance testing is more
meaningful on non-interactive applications, since for interactive applications the delays
introduced by user interaction overshadow the overhead of safety checking. The sample
applications are also file-intensive, so as to make extensive use of the portion of the Win32
API described by the prototype platform interface. Less file-intensive applications, or those
with a higher degree of user interaction, would suffer smaller performance penalties than
those measured here.
The sample applications used for testing were:
treecopy - a hand-written program that copies an entire directory tree one file at a time,
preserving the directory structure. treecopy makes heavy use of the file system
with nearly no computation, using the CopyFile and CreateDirectory API
functions.
tc-verbose - a version of the treecopy program that performs the same operations,
but prints the name of each file as it is copied. The overhead associated with console
1/0 makes the balance of computation vs. file 1/0 in this application more realistic.
pkzip (32-bit command-line version 2.50) - a file compression utility from PKWARE
Inc. It was run to compress an entire directory tree into an archive, using maximal
compression. pkzip makes heavy use of the file system by reading and writing
bytes from files, but also includes a significant amount of computation.
An alternate version of the ReadOnlyDir and NoOverwrite properties had to
be used when testing this program. This is because pkz ip requests write access to
files (those being added to the archive) on which it never actually performs write
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operations. This results in policy violations that limit desirable program behavior.
In order to allow this idiosyncratic behavior, the checking in these two policies was
moved from the openWrite and openAppend operations into the write opera-
tion. This sacrificed performance when compared to the more optimized versions of
these policies used for other testing.
All sample applications were run on a sample directory tree containing 1438 files in
57 directories, totalling 31MB. Source and target files were all located within the legal
path of the LimitPath policy, and source files were located within the read-only path of
the ReadOnlyDir policy. While violation conditions were thoroughly tested, paths and
command-line arguments for performance testing were chosen so that no violations would
occur, allowing programs to run to completion.
7.3 Performance Results
The sample applications and policies described above were used to test the performance of
Naccio/Win32. We report the time to compile a policy and transform an application, as well
as the run-time performance of the transformed applications. All performance results were
generated on a 500Mhz Pentium III workstation with 256MB SDRAM running Windows
NT 4.0 with Service Pack 3. The affected files were stored on a FAT file system on an EIDE
drive. No other programs were active on the test system during testing.
Because of the small set of resources and wrapped API functions supported by the pro-
totype implementation, policy compilation time was relatively short, varying little between
policies. The resource compiler ran in 2-3 seconds for the sample policies. The platform
compiler ran longer, primarily because of the time taken to compile sources into DLLs,
but still completed in just over 5 seconds. Since all of the file system API functions are
contained in a single DLL, only a few files were produced, and the amount of disk storage
required was also small: 90-130KB to store the policy-specific DLLs and policy description
file.
Application transformation is very fast, dominated by the time taken to copy files
before transformation so as to preserve their original versions. With the absence of the
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treecopy tc-verbose pkzip
Sample Application
Figure 7-1: Naccio/Win32 Prototype Performance Measurements
protective transformations, the actual modifications made were limited to import tables,
and no relocations were required, so the computational overhead of the transformations is
negligible. The protective transformations would add additional transformation time, but
since the static analyses involved are simple, and much of the work of the memory protection
described in Section 5.2 is based on wrappers rather than instruction-level transformation,
that time should also be quite small.
Run-time cost is the most important measurement of the performance of the Nac-
cio/Win32 prototype, since it is the aspect of performance most noticeable to a user.
Results from enforcing the sample policies on the applications described earlier are shown
in Figure 7-1. The run-time of transformed applications is normalized by the run-time of the
untransformed application, such that a value of 1.00 would indicate no run-time overhead.
All timing results were generated using the average of 100 tests to minimize the effect of
transient effects such as buffer and cache performance.
The overhead introduced by Naccio/Win32's safety checks is well within reasonable
ranges. Indeed, the change in performance based on transient operating system effects was
often much larger than the overhead itself, resulting in run-times up to 50% slower than
average even for untransformed code. The highest overhead demonstrated is just over 6%
for treecopy with the Combined policy. These results demonstrate that Naccio/Win32
is capable of enforcing useful policies on real applications without prohibitive performance
penalties.
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The run-time overhead introduced by Naccio depends on the policy being enforced.
The tc-verbose demonstrated seemingly anomalous results for the NoOverwrite
and LimitBytesWritten policies, caused by the high and unpredictable overheads
associated with console 1/0, but the other applications and policies paint a consistent
picture of the overhead associated with the sample policies. Since Naccio introduces
checking code only where it is necessary to enforce a particular policy, the overhead
introduced by transformation itself is small. More aggressive optimizations of wrapper
code would eliminate much of the overhead associated with the Null policy, and cause a
corresponding reduction for other policies. For instance, the wrapper on the API functions
to read or write bytes to a file is included even in policies that perform no relevant checking,
resulting in the high overhead for the Null policy on the pkzip application. Optimization
of wrappers could eliminate that wrapper entirely in policies that place no constraints on it.
Other policies introduce varying levels of overhead based on their complexity and the
frequency of checked API calls. The Limi tPath policy produces the smallest overhead,
since it must perform checking only when a new RFile object is constructed. The
LimitBytesWritten policy, in contrast, must perform checking each time bytes are
written to a file, and thus demonstrates higher overhead. The alternate versions of the
ReadOnlyDir and NoOverwrite properties used for pkzip require checking on
all write operations, and thus cause higher overhead for those policies as well as the
Combined policy.
The time taken by each check is significant as well as the frequency of checking. While
the checking performed by the LimitBytesWritten policy is frequent, it is also very
simple, consisting only of an increment and check of a counter. The ReadOnlyDir
and L imi t Path policies must perform string comparisons, making each individual check
more expensive. The NoOverwrite policy needs to query the existence of files when the
copy operation is checked, and this query requires a time-consuming API call. Since the
treecopy and tc -verbose applications make heavy use of file copying, they suffer a
high penalty from the enforcement of this policy. In all cases except tc=verbose, the
Combined policy imposes the highest run-time overhead, since it combines the checking
of all safety properties.
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The prototype implementation cannot be used to produce a precise prediction of the
performance of an industrial Naccio/Win32 implementation. More extensive checking of a
more comprehensive set of resources would incur a higher performance penalty, as would
more complicated or application-specific policies.
The protective transformations would also introduce additional run-time overhead that
is not reflected in this prototype. Based on previous SFI implementations [37] [29], it is
estimated that the jump-only form of SF1 described in Section 5.1 would introduce less
than 10% performance overhead on average applications, and that the non-local control-
flow mechanisms would introduce little additional overhead. The single-thread memory
protection mechanism presented in Section 5.2.1 has not been previously tested, so no
reliable estimate can be made of the precise performance overhead it would introduce, but
intelligent placement of unlocking and relocking operations in the platform interface should
allow this overhead to be acceptably small.
Despite these uncertainties, the current Naccio/Win32 prototype is a convincing proof-
of-concept. Naccio/Win32 provides a higher degree of flexibility and capability in the
description and enforcement of safety policies than perhaps any previously existing code
safety system, including interpreted languages and virtual machines, which have been
known to run 20 to 50 times slower than compiled C code [30].
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Chapter 8
Related Work1
When they are compared to Naccio, previous code safety efforts can be divided conceptually
between low-level and high-level code safety. High-Level code safety corresponds to
the resource-based safety policies that most users wish to enforce, and is analogous to
Naccio's policy transformations. Low-level code safety provides basic protections on code
capabilities and prevents the bypassing of higher level policies, and is analogous to Naccio's
protective transformations. The following two sections survey previous work in code safety,
dividing coverage between those two categories. Naccio uses code transformation to provide
both high-level and low-level code safety.
While there has been significant previous work in code safety, code transformation has
been used only rarely for this purpose. The most notable previous use of code transforma-
tion for safety is Software-Based Fault Isolation (SFI) [37] [29], described below in Section
8.1. SF1 modifies executables at machine-code level to provide memory safety, though
more recent work has generalized it to enforce a larger class of policies. SFI is being used
to provide non-bypassability of wrappers on Windows NT in the Generic Software Wrap-
pers project [9] described below in Section 8.2. Security Automata SFI Implementation
(SASI) [36], a system based on execution monitoring [28], and Ariel [23] (also described in
Section 8.2) both enforce safety policies by inserting code into executables in ways similar
to Naccio. Most previous work in editing of executables, however, has been directed toward
69
'This section is based in part on [7]
other purposes. Section 8.3 describes relevant work in this field.
8.1 Low-Level Code Safety
The minimum low-level code safety required to support most high-level code safety mech-
anisms is control-flow safety, memory safety, and stack safety [15]. Without control-flow
safety, an attacker could construct a program that jumps directly to the body of a system
call, bypassing any checking code. Without memory safety, a program could modify its
own code, and possibly the code and data of other programs. Without stack safety, code
in a program could alter the local stack data belonging to itself or another piece of code to
cause illegal actions to occur.
Safe programming languages can provide the memory safety and memory safety necessary
for low-level code safety. Memory safety can be provided by checking types statically,
preventing conversions between incompatible types, and limiting how particular types may
be used. Combining this with forced initialization, automatic storage management, and
array bounds checking prevents a program from referencing arbitrary memory addresses.
Type safe languages also provide control flow safety, since all jumps are through well-
defined language control structures. Several languages that guarantee varying degrees of
type and memory safety have been designed, including CLU [18], ML [20], and Java [35].
Unfortunately, safe languages are useful in providing code safety only if the execution
environment has some way of verifying that the program was created using the safe language.
The simplest solution is to use the source code directly in the execution environment, but
this has serious performance and code-disclosure consequences. This can only be avoided
if there is some way to verify that compiled code was created using the safe language.
SPIN [3] suggests using cryptographic signatures from a trusted compiler to verify this,
allowing trusted extensions to an operating system kernel using code written in a safe subset
of Modula-3. The need for a trusted compiler, however, adds bottlenecks and vulnerabilities
to the system. Naccio avoids these difficulties by operating on fully compiled executables.
Those executables can be generated from any language, avoiding the limitations placed on
programmers by systems based on safe languages.
70
Verification can ensure low-level code safety without the need for a safe language by
directly verifying necessary properties of an object file before allowing it to execute. Java
uses a byte-code verifier [40] to provide low-level security. Before loading a class, the
verifier performs data-flow analysis on the class implementation to ensure that it is type
safe, and that all control-flow instructions jump to valid locations. While Naccio/Win32's
static analysis of executables is far less extensive, it allows the avoidance of easily-detectable
dangerous behavior in untrusted code.
A more ambitious verification approach is Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) [21]. PCC
combines a program with a proof that the program satisfies certain properties. Before
installing the program, a certifier verifies the proof. In practice, PCC is limited by au-
tomatic proof-generation technology, and has been used most effectively only for simple
properties [22]. The significant size of proofs and difficulty of generating proofs for more
interesting policies limits the current usefulness of PCC.
Software-Based Fault Isolation (SFI) [37] [29] uses code transformation to limit all
memory writes, reads (optionally), and control-flow instructions to specific segments of
memory (potentially different for each type of instruction). This is done by inserting new
instructions before each memory or control-flow instruction whose target address cannot
be statically determined to be permissible. The additional instructions check at run-time
that the target address is legal. SFI was originally designed to enable untrusted extension
modules to be run in the memory space of trusted programs, such as an operating system
kernel or web browser. Omniware [1] used SFI in a specialized compiler to provide low-
level code safety in a mobile code system. MiSFIT [30] uses a specialized C++ compiler
to provide SF1 for the x86 processor platform. NAI labs is using a version of SFI applied
at run-time to avoid bypassing of their Generic Software Wrapper system (described in
Section 8.2) [8]. More details of SF1 were presented in Section 5.1.1. A modified version
of SFI, described in Section 5.1.2, is used to provide control-flow safety in Naccio/Win32.
71
8.2 High-Level Code Safety
Provided low-level code safety is in place, we can employ mechanisms for high-level code
safety with confidence that they cannot be circumvented by forged pointers and jumps.
A number of high-level code safety techniques have been invented, many directed toward
mobile code [38] or extensible systems. Only those most relevant to this work are discussed
here, including previous efforts based on wrappers, Java, Ariel, and systems based on
Execution Monitoring and operating system extensions.
Wrappers applied to system calls are the implementation technique used by Naccio/Win32
to limit program access to resources, but Naccio/Win32 is not the first system to use wrappers
for this purpose. Janus is a wrapper system intended to protect helper applications that may
be subverted by data from an adversary [11]. It uses special debugging features of the
Solaris operating system to cause wrapper code in a separate process to be invoked before
and after selected system calls, but can only cause the original system call to continue
unmodified or be denied, rather than being able to alter program behavior in a more general
way such as replacing the system call with another. Other disadvantages of Janus are that
it requires potentially expensive context switches for each wrapper, and is highly operating
system specific.
Work at NAI Labs on Generic Software Wrappers (GSW) has used a loadable kernel
module to implement wrappers for the Solaris and FreeBSD operating systems [9]. As
kernel code, the GSW wrapper system requires no additional context-switches, and is fully
protected from user code. GSW includes facilities to create wrappers that execute code
before, after, or in place of of specified system calls, and even a small kernel-resident
database for sharing data between wrappers. The kernel-based mechanism does have
the disadvantage of imposing a small overhead (about 3%) on all programs running on
the system, even those with no wrappers applied. A primary advantage of GSW is its
Wrapper Description Language (WDL), which allows wrappers to be written in a simple
way that provides some level of platform-independence. This is based on a platform
description that specifies attributes of system calls and their return values and arguments
(such as identifying paths, file descriptors, etc). This mechanism does not go nearly as
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far as Naccio's abstract resources and platform interface, however, and thus is unlikely
to provide the same degree of platform-independent capability. Nonetheless, the current
C-based resource implementations and a Naccio platform interface written in WDL on each
applicable platform could allow Naccio to be applied to additional platforms quickly using
GSW rather than direct program transformation as the method of applying wrappers.
The current GSW platforms are very similar (both being UNIX variants), and it remains
to be seen how well the current abstractions of WDL will extend to other platforms. A
port of GSW to Windows NT is currently in progress, and applies wrappers to Win32 API
functions as Naccio/Win32 does [31]. Since NT provides no equivalent of the loadable
kernel module, the wrappers are applied by modifications to address tables at run-time.
Currently, though, no low-level protection exists to make these wrappers non-bypassable.
Work is in progress to develop a system based on SFI to provide this, focusing on application
of SFI transformations at run-time to avoid the difficulties of disassembly of x86 binaries
as well as potential licensing issues with the transformation of programs [8]. When this
work is complete, it could provide a suitable implementation of most of the protective
transformations needed by Naccio/Win32.
Java and its run-time environment provide high-level security by allowing access to system
resources only through the Java API. The library functions are implemented so that code
safety checks are performed before certain system calls are executed [10]. Security policies
are defined by creating custom Java classes that implement those checks [6]. JDK 1.2 has
introduced more flexible means for applying different levels of security to different portions
of code [12]. All of Java's mechanisms, however, are limited by the points at which API
functions make calls to security checking, leaving a user with no way of enforcing policies
on functions that call no checks. For instance, while Java provides a hook for security
checking when a file is opened (allowing arbitrary security policies on which files may
be opened), it provides no such opportunity when individual bytes are written to files,
making it impossible to enforce security policies that limit the number or contents of bytes
written. The primary reason this limitation remains is the fixed overhead associated with
a Java security call, even if no policy is being enforced. Naccio's resource descriptions
and platform interface provide enough flexibility to allow checking to be performed on any
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set of system calls, without the policy author needing to be concerned with the details of
precisely which system calls are being affected. Instead, the policy author reasons abstractly
about which resources should be protected, and the policy compiler inserts safety checking
at appropriate points, introducing no overhead at points where no checking is required for
a particular policy.
The Ariel Project describes policies using a declarative language and enforces them by
inserting code into Java classes. The transformations performed by Ariel [23] to enforce a
policy are similar to those used by Naccio/JavaVM, the Naccio system for Java bytecodes.
Because of the declarative nature of its policy descriptions, Ariel is unable to describe
policies that react to violations by modifying program behavior, as can be expressed using
Naccio's mechanisms. Policies are described at the level of the Java API so they are not
portable across platforms, and creating a policy requires intimate knowledge of the API
rather than utilizing a more abstract notion of resources.
Execution Monitoring is the method of enforcement utilized by the class of enforcement
mechanisms that Schneider dubs EM [28]. They enforce security policies by monitoring
a target system and terminating an execution immediately before the policy would be
violated. Enforcement mechanisms in class EM can only enforce security policies that are
safety policies (those that can be defined as a predicate on a prefix of execution states).
Naccio is not in class EM because it modifies the application instead of simply monitoring an
execution. However, with restrictions on the platform interface, safety property definitions,
and static analyses performed by the application transformer, Naccio can be viewed as an
execution monitor in class EM. Naccio policies that do not satisfy these restrictions can
change the behavior of the program in more fundamental ways and are harder to classify,
but also potentially more useful.
Schneider suggests techniques for using finite-state automata to express safety policies
enforceable by execution monitoring. Ulfar Erlingsson has developed a Security Automata
SFI Implementation (SASI) [36], a system that enforces policies defined using automata by
inserting code in program executables (x86 assembly). Although no performance analysis is
available, SASI should be able to enforce many policies more efficiently than Naccio since
it does not require the overhead associated with maintaining run-time objects corresponding
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to abstract resources. The main advantage of Naccio over SASI is that it offers a convenient,
platform-independent method of defining policies.
Operating Systems provide security by starting from resources and determining the privi-
lege level of each program that attempts to manipulate those resources, rather than starting
from the program and trying to constrain its effect on system resources as Naccio's trans-
formations do. Naccio's high-level methodologies could equally well be applied to an
operating system centered approach. The application centered approach was chosen be-
cause it eliminates ties to a particular operating system, and provides a more general
platform for exploring research issues. It is also easier to deploy a code transformer than
an operating system kernel modification.
At a coarse level, modem operating systems already constrain the use of resources. For
example, UNIX prevents programs from violating file system permissions. A few projects
have attempted to extend this in a way that restricts what specific programs or processes
may do. Wichers et al. suggest protecting a system from malicious programs using per-file
access control lists [39]. Another project, TRON [2], is a process-specific file protection
system for the UNIX operating system. It allows users to create shells with specific access
permissions that apply to all programs executed in the shell. The disadvantage of operating-
system based solutions is that they are likely to have an impact on trusted applications as
well as on untrusted ones. Naccio's transformations include all safety checking within the
application itself, thus having no effect on applications that are not running under a safety
policy.
8.3 Binary Editing
Most work in binary code editing has been directed toward the purposes of instrumentation
or optimization. Instrumentation of executables inserts instructions that allow data to be
gathered about the executable's run-time behavior, such as memory accesses, procedure
calls, etc. Binary editing has also been used for optimization of executables, through
removal of redundant code, code reordering to enhance cache performance, interprocedural
optimization of data flow, and other methods.
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Key challenges in binary editing include code discovery, relocations, and handling of
indirect jumps. Code discovery is the process by which code is distinguished from data.
Since code and data are often interspersed in memory, it is important that code be identified
for modification, while data is left unchanged, lest the modified program behave incorrectly.
Relocations are required to fix up addresses used by jump instructions and memory accesses,
based on the fact that the location of an instruction or piece of data in the modified program
may not be identical to its location in the original program. Indirect jump instructions
(those which use the contents of a register or memory location as their target) compound
the problem because their target often cannot be determined at transform time. Most binary
editors make use of some level of added information in the executable beyond raw code and
data, ranging from relocation information (often included in executables for the purpose
of the loader), to a full-fledged debugging table that identifies procedure entry points and
data regions. If any of these tools are to be used for security-sensitive purposes such as
Naccio, the use of such additional information in code modification must be minimized and
carefully checked, so that inaccuracies in that information cannot introduce security flaws.
In general, this must be done by some sort of verification of any additional information
used, or by making worst-case assumptions in cases where properties of the program cannot
be determined exactly.
While most binary editing tools developed have been specialized tools for a single
purpose, a number of attempts have been made to develop more general binary editing
systems. EEL [17] took this goal farthest, with a platform-independent binary editing
system. EEL translates fully-linked programs into a platform-independent register transfer
language (RTL), and allows modifications to be performed on RTL before translating
the program back to machine instructions. In theory, the same transformation rules can
be applied to any machine platform through the use of RTL, but EEL has as yet been
implemented only for SPARC executables running under SunOS and Solaris, and thus its
promise of portability is unrealized (though a partial port for RS6000 AIX exists). EEL's
RTL is also very RISC-like, and thus it remains to be seen whether EEL could successfully
support other processor types such as x86.
DYNINST is a system for run-time instrumentation that has been successfully deployed
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on the x86, Alpha, PowerPC, and SPARC platforms [13] [14]. It adds instrumentation at
run-time by replacing instructions with fixed jumps to instrumentation routines, in a way
similar to the application of SFI checking in Naccio/Win32. DYNINST uses a platform-
independent language called MDL that is tailored to program instrumentation and allows
instructions and data of the types needed by instrumentation to be handled easily.
Like EEL, OM [33] also makes use of an RTL in performing link-time modifications
on the Alpha platform. Relocation information in object files is used to aid in the modifica-
tions. ATOM [34] is a framework built to simplify the process of program instrumentation
using OM. ATOM provides a simple set of APIs for instrumenting programs and navigating
the structure of a program, as well as being distributed with several standard instrumenta-
tion tools. Unlike OM, ATOM does not allow arbitrary modifications to an executable; in
particular it does not allow instructions from the original executable to be deleted or re-
ordered. ATOM parses fully compiled executables, but requires that relocation information
be included by the compiler.
Like OM, ATOM supports only Alpha executables, but has been successfully deployed
for the OSF/1, Digital UNIX, and Windows NT operating systems. The NT version of
ATOM was based on libraries developed for Spike[4], an instrumentation and optimization
tool for NT executables. Along with its binary editing, Spike also intercepts system calls
via replacement of DLLs to transparently substitute instrumented executables and DLLs for
their unmodified versions. While the number of calls wrapped by Spike is small, its methods
of doing so are similar to those used in Naccio/Win32. Spike and its component libraries
would be a suitable tool for the instruction-level transformations described in Chapter 5,
required by Naccio to ensure that higher level safety mechanisms are not bypassed.
Another Win32 binary editing tool is Etch [27], a general tool for instrumentation
and optimization of Win32 executables on the x86 platform. Microsoft is also currently
researching similar technology under the name Vulcan [32]. Neither Etch nor Vulcan is
currently available for research purposes.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions
While the design of Naccio/Win32 is complete, and the prototype implementation proves
key features of the design, there is still much work to be done. Section 9.1 surveys some of
the tasks that remain and suggests directions that may be taken by future research. Section
9.2 concludes by summarizing and evaluating major accomplishments of Naccio/Win32.
9.1 Future Work
Many significant research and implementation tasks remain for future work on Nac-
cio/Win32 and Naccio in general. The most obvious task for Naccio/Win32 is to implement
aspects of the design not included in the current prototype. Full implementation and testing
of the protective transformations would provide a much clearer picture of the potential of
Naccio/Win32 to protect against malicious code produced by knowledgeable adversaries.
By taking advantage of the existing mechanisms for application of wrappers, many of
the protections required of the protective transformations can be achieved in a simple and
processor-independent way as described in Chapter 5. The use of SFI for control-flow
protection must, however, be processor-specific, and different challenges will have to be
met for each processor architecture attempted.
The largest open issue in the Naccio/Win32 design is multithreaded memory protection.
As described in Section 5.2, the memory safety portion of the protective transformations
can, in its current form, guarantee protection only for applications with a single thread
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of control. Section 5.2.2 described possible approaches to providing proper protective
transformations for multithreaded applications, but more investigation and testing is needed
to determine which approach will produce the best results.
The needs of the protective transformations will also help to drive work in the analysis
and optimization of wrapper source code derived from the platform interface. The current
implementation includes no such optimizations, and only relatively simple optimizations
of resource implementations. Thus there is much more potential for work in improving the
policy-specific optimizations performed by the policy compiler, as well as efficient ways of
combining the standard functionality needed by protective transformations with the custom
functionality described by the platform interface.
The other main limitation of the current Naccio/Win32 prototype is its support for only
a limited subset of Win32 API functionality. A more complete platform interface would
allow Naccio/Win32 to protect a broader range of resources used by a wider variety of
applications. Supplemental APIs and programming methodologies such as MFC, DirectX,
and COM are also deserving of individual consideration. Such supplemental APIs could be
supported indirectly by treating their implementations as untrusted code, but there could be
benefits to the performance, flexibility, clarity, and accuracy of policy enforcement if they
are included in the platform interface and supported directly. Tools that could automatically
generate platform interfaces for supplemental APIs based on core APIs and source code are
worthy of future investigation.
No security system can be trusted until it has been tested and used extensively. Auto-
mated verification systems to ensure the safety of policies or platform interfaces would be
a highly useful tool for Naccio, and worthy of investigation. Since the danger of vulnera-
bilities introduced by bugs or flaws in design or implementation is ever-present, however, it
is important for a security system to receive public scrutiny and testing before it is trusted
for the protection of vital systems. The Naccio/JavaVM prototype is currently undergoing
such scrutiny through a World Wide Web site that allows remote users to upload code and
attempt to attack the system by bypassing Naccio safety policies on file system and network
use. Prizes are offered to any who can successfully bypass security as an incentive. Once its
low-level code safety and support for the Win32 API is more complete, Naccio/Win32 could
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be tested in a similar fashion. A more extensive test would require large-scale deployment
of Naccio/Win32 in a wider variety of situations.
A large part of the promised benefit of Naccio is the use of simple, platform-independent
safety policies. Win32 is the second platform for which Naccio was implemented, and thus
Naccio/Win32 is the first test of this promise. For that promise to be fully realized, further
platforms should be implemented. It is estimated that the work involved in creating the
policy compiler and application transformer for each platform will be significantly less once
a small number of platforms have been implemented. Most modem operating systems share
many standard design principles so the enforcement of policies on any operating system
will share many of the same challenges both in the application of policy transformations,
and in the type of protective transformations that must be performed. Thus much design
work from Naccio/Win32 should be applicable to other operating system platforms. Still,
care will need to be taken to ensure that the subtleties of an individual platform are properly
accounted for, and the task of creating a complete platform interface will be significant and
unique for each new set of system calls.
9.2 Summary and Evaluation
This thesis has described Naccio/Win32, which applies the Naccio architecture to the en-
forcement of safety policies on Win32 executables. Naccio provides a platform-independent
architecture for specifying safety policies as limitations on the use of abstract resources,
and for the enforcement of those safety policies by transforming programs. Naccio/Win32
enforces policies by constraining the use of the Win32 API, and uses transformations to pro-
vide the low-level code safety required to ensure that those constraints cannot be bypassed.
A prototype of Naccio/Win32 has been implemented and tested, and results described here
have shown that this enforcement can be achieved without unreasonable costs in time or
effort.
The Naccio architecture and Naccio/Win32 were designed to provide robust code safety
with the three key goals of flexibility, usability, and efficiency as primary concerns. Naccio's
simple, platform-independent policy-description mechanisms allow a broad range of safety
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policies to be expressed easily, including policies tailored for a particular application or
environment, or introduced to respond to a newly discovered threat. Platform-specific appli-
cation transformers like Naccio/Win32 allow platform-independent policies to be enforced
on applications on many different platforms, while encapsulating the platform-specific
knowledge needed to ensure that policies cannot be bypassed by hostile code.
Using transformation to integrate safety checking into applications themselves provides
many benefits. Since safety checking is confined to the application, trusted applications
experience no overhead. Transformations can be applied to fully-compiled programs in
native executable format, eliminating all of the problems inherent in re-compilation, or
the use of an interpreted language. Pre-compilation of policies to native code allows
transformation times to be small, minimizing the noticeable time before a program can be
run, and policy-specific optimizations allow the safety checking to be limited to exactly the
requirements of the policy to be enforced, eliminating unnecessary overhead at run-time.
The primary means of enforcement used by Naccio/Win32 is attaching checking to
the Win32 API of system functions. This API is well-documented, allowing it to be
thoroughly described in the platform interface, and also well separated from application
code by the interface between an application and its DLLs, making the application of
wrappers easy. Because of that separation, the transformations applied to application
code are limited to import table modifications, and low level protective transformations that
ensure that wrapper-based protections cannot be bypassed. These protective transformations
themselves use the wrapper-based protections to good effect, and the remainder of their work
is performed by instruction modifications based on Software-Based Fault Isolation [37].
Naccio/Win32's design achieves its three key goals in all of these ways, and the current
Naccio/Win32 prototype provides a proof of concept that shows that they can be achieved
for real applications and real safety needs. The potential usefulness and effectiveness
of Naccio/Win32 is clear in its design, and the methodologies introduced by Naccio and
Naccio/Win32 can provide great benefits to users in the future. It is hoped that through
further research this potential can be further explored and realized, and that the ideas
presented here will aid in protecting users from the dangers of the modem computing
environment, allowing them to take better advantage of it in the future.
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If Naccio/Win32 or a similar system were put into large-scale use, users would be able
to download and execute code freely without any worry of damage caused by malicious
or buggy programs. Transformations would be applied automatically as part of a browser
or program installer, with policies selected by a system administrator or automated tool,
or by the user in order to provide safety custom-tailored to the needs of the user and the
application. The safe distribution of code will increase the safety of current uses of mobile
code (such as web-based applets), and encourage further uses such as component-based
software downloaded on-demand, active content through programs included in documents,
or automatically retrieved program updates and content viewers. Code safety should ideally
be applied even to trusted non-mobile applications, in order to protect users from bugs and
increase their confidence in the safety of their data.
The uses of code safety are many and varied if it can be flexible, efficient, and easy to
use enough to meet every demand that arises. The Naccio architecture meets those goals,
and by putting Naccio to use on the dominant system platform Naccio/Win32 demonstrates
that the promise of flexible code safety is not an empty one, but an opportunity to make the
computing environments of tomorrow safe for everybody.
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Appendix A
Sample Safety Policies
This appendix includes the source code of the sample policies described in Section 7.1, and
used in testing of the Naccio/Win32 prototype. The full resource descriptions are included
first to aid in understanding of the policies.
A.1 Resource Descriptions
The RF il e System and RF ile resource descriptions are as described in Section 2.2.1,
except for the inclusion of the previously-elided operations.
The RF ile Sys t em Resource Description
global resource RFileSystem
operations
initialize ()
"Called when execution starts."
terminate ()
"Called just before execution ends."
openRead (file: RFile)
"Called before a file is opened for reading."
openCreate (file: RFile)
"Called before a new file is created for writing."
openWrite (file: RFile)
"Called before an existing file is opened for writing."
openAppend (file: RFile)
"Called before an existing file is opened for appending."
close (file: RFile)
"Called before a file is closed."
write (file: RFile, n: int)
"Called before n bytes are written to a file."
preRead (file: RFile, n: int)
"Called before up to n bytes are read from a file."
postRead (file: RFile, n: int)
"Called after n bytes were read from a file."
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delete (file: RFile)
"Called before a file is deleted."
makeDirectory (file: RFile)
"Called before creating a directory."
rename (file: RFile, newfile: RFile)
"Called before renaming the specified file."
copy (file: RFile, newfile: RFile)
"Called before copying the specified file."
observeExists (file: RFile)
"Called before revealing if a named file exists."
observeExists (file: RFile)
"Called before revealing if a file exists."
observeIsFile (file: RFile)
"Called before distinguishing a file from a directory."
observeLength (file: RFile)
"Called before revealing the length of a file."
observeList (file: RFile)
"Called before revealing the list of files in a directory."
observeLastModifiedTime (file: RFile)
"Called before revealing when a file was last modified."
setLastModifiedTime (file: RFile)
"Called before setting the last modified time of a file."
observeLastAccessTime (file: RFile)
"Called before revealing when a file was last accessed."
setLastAccessTime (file: RFile)
"Called before setting the last accessed time of a file."
observeCreationTime (file: RFile)
"Called before revealing when a file was created."
setCreationTime (file: RFile)
"Called before setting the last creation time of a file."
observeAttributes (file: RFile)
"Called before revealing file attributes."
setAttributes (file: RFile)
"Called before setting file attributes"
The RF il e Resource Description
resource RFile
operations
RFile (pathname: String)
"Called to construct a new RFile object."
finalize ()
"Called when finished with an RFile object."
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A.2 Sample Policies
As described in section 2.3, a safety policy is made up of a combination of safety properties
with parameters. The sample safety properties used in testing the Naccio/Win32 prototype
are listed here, along with the state blocks that they use to maintain state information.
The Null policy includes no safety checking code at all. For all but the Combined
policy, the other policies used included only a single property, so their policy code is not
included here. The code for the Combined policy is a simple combination of properties
as shown below.
policy Combined {
NoOverwrite
LimitBytesWritten(100000000)
LimitFilePath( "d: \\legal")
SetReadOnlyDir( "d:\\legal\\readonly")
}
A.2.1 Safety Properties
Note that the matchesPathPref ix, getFileSize, and f ileExists functions are
provided by the Naccio library.
The L imi tPath Safety Property
property LimitPath (path: String) {
requires FileNames;
precheck RFile.RFile (pathname: String) {
if (!matchesPathPrefix(pathname,path)) {
violation("Attempt to access illegal file " + pathname +
Only files in the subtree + path +
may be accessed.");
}
}
}
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The ReadOnlyDir Safety Property
property ReadOnlyDir (path: String) {
requires FileNames;
precheck RFileSystem.openWrite(file: RFile),
RFileSystem.openCreate(file: RFile),
RFileSystem.openAppend(file: RFile),
RFileSystem.preDelete(file: RFile),
RFileSystem.setLastModifiedTime(file: RFile),
RFileSystem.setLastAccessTime(file: RFile),
RFileSystem.setCreationTime(file: RFile),
RFileSystem.setAttributes(file: RFile),
RFileSystem.makeDirectory(file: RFile) {
if(matchesPathPrefix(file.name,path)) {
violation("Attempt to write file " + file.name +
in the read-only subtree " + path + .");
}
}
precheck RFileSystem.rename(file: RFile, newfile: RFile) {
if(matchesPathPrefix(file.name,path)) {
violation("Attempt to write file " + file.name +
in the read-only subtree " + path + ".");
}
if(matchesPathPrefix(newfile.name,path)) {
violation("Attempt to write file " + newfile.name +
in the read-only subtree " + path +
}
}
precheck RFileSystem.copy(file: RFile, newfile: RFile) {
if(matchesPathPrefix(newfile.name,path)) {
violation("Attempt to write file " + newfile.name +
in the read-only subtree " + path +
}
}
The alternate version of the ReadOnlyDir policy used for testing with pkz ip moved
checking from open operations into the write operation simply by changing the declaration of
the first precheck clause. The openWrite and openAppend operations are removed
and the write operation is added. The code of the check remains the same. The
openCreate operation is still checked, since creating a file should count as writing even
if no bytes are written.
The NoOverwrite Safety Property
The NoOverwrite property differs from its description in Section 2.2.1 only in the
inclusion of previously elided resource operations.
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property NoOverwrite {
requires FileNames;
precheck RFileSystem.openWrite(file: RFile),
RFileSystem.openAppend(file: RFile) ,
RFileSystem.preDelete(file: RFile),
RFileSystem.setLastModifiedTime(file: RFile),
RFileSystem.setLastAccessTime(file: RFile),
RFileSystem.setCreationTime(file: RFile),
RFileSystem.setAttributes(file: RFile),
RFileSystem.rename(file: RFile, newfile: RFile) {
violation ("Attempt to affect existing file " + file.name + ".");
precheck RFileSystem.copy(file: RFile, newfile: RFile)
if(fileExists(newfile.name)) {
violation ("Attempt to affect existing file " + file.name + ".");
}
}
}
The alternate version of the NoOverwrite policy used for testing with pkzip moved
checking from open operations into the write operation, using the state variable from the
CreationMark state block to keep track of which files were pre-existing. The requires
clause and the declaration of the first precheck clause are changed, and the new check is
added to the write operation.
property NoOverwrite {
requires FileNames, CreationMark;
precheck RFileSystem.preDelete(file: RFile),
RFileSystem.setLastModifiedTime(file: RFile),
RFileSystem.setLastAccessTime(file: RFile),
RFileSystem.setCreationTime(file: RFile),
RFileSystem.setAttributes (file: RFile),
RFileSystem.rename(file: RFile, newfile: RFile)
violation ("Attempt to affect existing file " + file.name + ");
}
precheck RFileSystem.copy(file: RFile, newfile: RFile) {
if(fileExists(newfile.name)) {
violation ("Attempt to affect existing file " + file.name + ".");
}
}
precheck RFileSystem.write(file: RFile, nbytes: int)
if(!file.created) {
violation ("Attempt to affect existing file " + file.name + ".");
}
}
}
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The LimitBytesWritten Safety Property
property LimitBytesWritten (n: int) {
requires TrackTotalBytesWritten, FileNames;
precheck RFileSystem.write (file: RFile, nbytes: int) {
if (byteswritten > n) (
violation("Attempt to write more than " + n + " bytes. Writing " +
nbytes + " to " + file.name + ".");
}
}
// Copying is treated as writing the full size of the file.
precheck RFileSystem.copy (file: RFile, newfile: RFile) {
if (bytes-written > n) {
violation ("Attempt to write more than " + n + " bytes writing " +
getFileSize(file.name) + " bytes copying " + file.name +
to " + newfile.name + ".");
}
}
}
A.2.2 State Blocks
The F il eName s State Block
stateblock FileNames augments RFile {
addfield name: String;
precode RFile (pathname: String) {
name = pathname;
}
}
The TrackTotalBytesWritten State Block
The TrackTotalBytesWritten state block differs from its description in Section
2.2.1 only in the addition of handling for the copy operation.
stateblock TrackTotalBytesWritten augments RFileSystem {
requires FileNames;
addfield byteswritten: int = 0;
precode write (file: RFile, nbytes: int) {
byteswritten += nbytes;
}
precode copy (file: RFile, newfile: RFile) {
byteswritten += getFileSize(file.name);
}
}
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The CreationMark State Blocks
These stateblocks keep track of created files for the alternate version of the NoOverwr i te
property.
stateblock CreationMark augments RFileSystem {
requires RFileCreationMark;
precode openCreate(file: RFile) {
file.created = true;
}
precode makeDirectory(file: RFile) {
file.created = true;
}
}
stateblock RFileCreationMark augments RFile {
addfield created: boolean;
precode RFile(pathname: String) {
created = false;
}
}
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